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Articles 
 
REDESIGNING THE SCIENCE COURT 
JUSTIN SEVIER
*
 
ABSTRACT 
 Scientific evidence is a field in crisis.  The validity and reliabil-
ity of forensic techniques have been criticized by nearly every ac-
tor in the legal community—by attorneys, judges, the legal acad-
emy, and even the National Academy of Sciences—and high-
profile cases of scientific evidence gone awry have garnered na-
tional attention.  Policymakers have suggested many solutions to 
the scientific evidence crisis, including a controversial proposal 
to remove complex scientific cases from state and federal dockets 
and to hear those cases instead in a specialized “science court.” 
 Science court proposals face one substantial hurdle: they have 
become exceedingly unpopular.  But this is for good reason; it is 
entirely possible that the architects of the science court did not 
design it correctly.  I argue—with evidence from original psycho-
logical experiments—that public approval of a lawmaking body is 
largely a function of two discrete psychological dimensions: deci-
sional accuracy and procedural legitimacy.  Earlier science court 
proposals failed to maximize public perceptions of these im-
portant psychological values. 
 I propose a redesigned science court, which includes features 
of both adversarial and inquisitorial decisionmaking paradigms 
and prioritizes these dual values.  I then report the results from 
original experiments that illustrate: (1) that litigants prefer the 
redesigned science court significantly more than they prefer other 
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proposals to maintain the integrity of scientific evidence, and (2) 
the redesigned science court enjoys greater perceptions of deci-
sional accuracy and procedural legitimacy from litigants.  Impli-
cations for institutional design—and for the future of science in 
the courtroom—are discussed. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As a child, Sally Clark was told that she was not bright enough to be 
an attorney.
1
  Upon graduation from college, she instead worked as a mer-
chant banker until she married her husband, Steve, in 1990.
2
  With his en-
couragement, she decided to pursue her dream of becoming a licensed at-
torney specializing in corporate finance.
3
  Together, she and Steve enjoyed 
a thriving law practice at a successful firm in Manchester, England.
4
  But 
just five years later, everything changed.
5
  Sally Clark would go on to stand 
trial for the murder of two of her children, and just a few years after that, at 
the age of forty-two, Sally Clark would be dead.
6
  Her trial would come to 
be considered one of the great miscarriages of justice involving scientific 
evidence. 
Sally Clark’s first two children died shortly after birth, of what the 
Clarks believed to be “‘cot death’” or Sudden Infant Death Syndrome 
(“SIDS”).7  The British government, however, charged Sally Clark with the 
premeditated murder of her sons.
8
  The government’s star witness, pediatri-
cian Sir Roy Meadow, provided the jury with expert statistical evidence, in 
which he calculated what he believed to be the odds that two children born 
to the same household would die of SIDS.
9
  He calculated the odds to be 1 
in 73 million,
10
 the result of multiplying the odds of each individual SIDS 
                                                          
 1.  Obituary, Sally Clark, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 19, 2007, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1545933/Sally-Clark.html. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. (“The Clarks believed that their two small sons had died naturally, the victims of so-
called ‘cot-death’”).  Sudden Infant Death Syndrome is characterized by a child’s sudden, unex-
pected death that lacks any medical explanation.  Rachel Y. Moon, Rosemary S. C. Horne & Fern 
R. Hauck, Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, 370 LANCET 1578, 1578 (2007).  The cause of SIDS is 
currently unknown.  Id. at 1582. 
 8.  See Obituary, supra note 1. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
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death (1 in 8,543) together.
11
  On that overwhelming statistical evidence, 
the jury convicted Sally Clark of murdering her sons.
12
 
There was, however, a problem with Sir Roy Meadow’s testimony: it 
was completely wrong.
13
  The pediatrician multiplied the individual proba-
bilities together because he had assumed, without evidence, that the two 
SIDS deaths at issue were probabilistically independent events, when in 
fact, there might be environmental or genetic factors that increase the likeli-
hood of a second SIDS death in a family after one has already occurred.
14
  
Nobody immediately caught this statistical error—not the jurors, not the at-
torneys, not the judge, and not several appellate justices.
15
  Sally Clark 
spent over three years in prison before the error was finally corrected and 
her conviction was overturned.
16
  She never recovered physically or psycho-
logically from the deaths of her sons and from her wrongful conviction.
17
  
She died of alcohol poisoning four years after regaining her freedom.
18
 
Sally Clark’s cautionary tale is not limited to statistical evidence and is 
not limited to foreign nations.  Consider the case of Douglas Prade in Ohio 
state court.
19
  Douglas Prade’s ex-wife, a doctor, was found shot to death in 
a parking lot the day before Thanksgiving in 1998.
20
  Akron Police Captain 
Douglas Prade, who had a stormy relationship with his ex-wife, ultimately 
                                                          
 11.  R v. Clark, [2003] EWCA (Crim) 1020, [173], [181] (Eng.) (overturning Sally Clark’s 
conviction and declaring the statistical evidence “wholly irrelevant”). 
 12.  R v. Clark, [2000] EWCA (Crim) 54, [114] (Eng.). 
 13.  Clark, [2003] EWCA (Crim) at [173]. 
 14.  Ray Hill, Multiple Sudden Infant Deaths—Coincidence or Beyond Coincidence?, 18 
PAEDIATRIC & PRENATAL EPIDEMOLOGY 320, 321–22 (2004) (“It is intuitively clear that an in-
fant in a family which has already suffered a SIDS will be at increased risk of SIDS, because 
many genetic and environmental factors will be the same.”); Letter from Peter Green, President, 
Royal Statistical Soc’y, to Lord Chancellor (Jan. 23, 2002) (on file with author); Press Release, 
Royal Statistical Soc’y, Royal Statistical Society Concerned by Issues Raised in Sally Clark Case 
(Oct. 23, 2001) (on file with author). 
 15.  Clark, [2003] EWCA (Crim) at [172]–[180]. 
 16.  Id. at [181]; Ben Goldacre, Prosecuting and Defending by Numbers, THE GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 27, 2006, 19:24 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/science/2006/oct/28/uknews1; see also 
Hill, supra note 14, at 320. 
 17.  Alcohol Killed Mother Sally Clark, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2007, 12:31 GMT), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/essex/7082411.stm; Obituary, supra note 1. 
 18.  Thair Shaikh, Sally Clark, Mother Wrongly Convicted of Killing Her Sons, Found Dead 
at Home, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2007, 5:22 EDT), 
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2007/mar/17/childrensservices.uknews; Alcohol Killed 
Mother Sally Clark, supra note 17 (stating that Clark “was never able to pick up the threads of her 
life and career”). 
 19.   Rick Armon et al., Former Akron Police Captain Douglas Prade Cleared in Murder, 
Released from Prison, AKRON BEACON J. (Jan. 30, 2013, 9:07 AM), 
http://www.ohio.com/news/break-news/former-akron-police-captain-douglas-prade-cleared-in-
murder-released-from-prison-1.368825. 
 20.  Id.  
  
774 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:770 
stood trial for her murder.
21
  A bite mark on his ex-wife’s lab coat became 
the crux of the State’s case against Prade.22  A “[f]orensic dentist expert” 
testified that the bite mark, particularly the mark left from the attacker’s 
bottom teeth, was a perfect match for Prade’s jaw.23  After hearing the ex-
pert’s testimony that “‘[e]very mark lined up,’” the jury then took just four 
hours to convict Prade of first-degree murder.
24
  Although the jury was gen-
erally silent with respect to the nature of the deliberations, at least one juror 
reported that the bite mark evidence “sealed her decision.”25 
Douglas Prade remained in jail for fifteen years until early 2013, when 
previously untested DNA evidence left on the lab coat near the bite, collect-
ed by students involved in the Ohio Innocence Project at the University of 
Cincinnati, excluded Prade as a match and established his innocence.
26
  
Moreover, other dental experts cast serious doubt on the forensic dental tes-
timony, noting that not only was Prade’s jaw misaligned, but his dentures 
could not have produced the wound.
27
  The irony could not have been lost 
on Prade; scientific expertise gave him his freedom, but it also stole fifteen 
years of his life from him.
28
 
Scientific evidence is a field in crisis.  These anecdotes are emblematic 
of a disturbing trend in which dubious scientific expertise—and even junk 
science—is routinely admitted into evidence in court, notwithstanding a 
mountain of empirical data questioning the efficacy of such evidence.  Re-
cent stories of lab technicians deliberately falsifying the results from scien-
                                                          
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Dennis McEaneney, (1988 Trial Coverage) Bite Evidence Lines Up: Forensic Dental 
Expert Testifies That Wound on Slain Doctor’s Arm Matches Ex-Husband’s Lower Front Teeth. 
‘Every Mark Lined Up,’ Akron Dentist Says, AKRON BEACON J. (Jan. 29, 2013, 1:49 PM), 
http://barberton.ohio.com/1998-trial-coverage-bite-evidence-lines-up-forensic-dental-expert-
testifies-that-wound-on-slain-doctor-s-arm-matches-ex-husband-s-lower-front-teeth-every-mark-
lined-up-akron-dentist-says-1.368882. 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id.; Dennis McEaneney & Charlene Nevada, (1988 Trial Coverage) Evidence Over-
whelms Doubt: Jurors Mostly Mum About Deliberations, but Prosecution Uses Circumstantial 
Case to Convict Ex-Akron Police Capt. Douglas Prade. One Says Bite Mark Sealed It, AKRON 
BEACON J. (Jan. 29, 2013, 1:50 PM), http://barberton.ohio.com/1998-trial-coverage-evidence-
overwhelms-doubt-jurors-mostly-mum-about-deliberations-but-prosecution-uses-circumstantial-
case-to-convict-ex-akron-police-capt-douglas-prade-one-says-bite-mark-sealed-it-1.368884.  
 25.  See McEaneney & Nevada, supra note 24. 
 26.  See Armon et al., supra note 19. 
 27.  Dennis McEaneney & Charlene Nevada, (1988 Trial Coverage) Bite Evidence Disputed: 
Dental Expert Says Former Akron Police Captain Has Misaligned Jaw, Dentures and Wouldn’t 
Have Been Able to Leave Wound Found on Slain Doctor’s Left Arm, AKRON BEACON J. (Jan. 29, 
2013, 1:49 PM), http://barberton.ohio.com/news/1998-trial-coverage-bite-evidence-disputed-
dental-expert-says-former-akron-police-captain-has-misaligned-jaw-dentures-and-wouldn-t-have-
been-able-to-leave-wound-found-on-slain-doctor-s-left-arm-1.368883. 
 28.  Armon et al., supra note 19. 
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tific testing in criminal trials compound the problem.
29
  In perhaps the most 
egregious case, a serologist in the West Virginia State Police Crime Labora-
tory presented false evidence—including “dry-lab” results, in which he 
never performed any tests at all—in over one hundred and thirty different 
cases, resulting in nearly $6.5 million in damages for wrongful conviction 
and in the exoneration of nine defendants.
30
  The scope of the problem is 
pervasive; issues with scientific expertise affect not only forensics in crimi-
nal trials, but also evidence in civil cases involving medical malpractice, 
toxic torts, civil commitment, and economic damages.
31
 
This crisis is dire but not new.  Even before criticisms of forensic 
techniques began to mount—culminating in the National Academy of Sci-
ences’ devastating critique in 2009,32 courts, legislators, and other policy-
makers expressed concern that jurors were failing to give scientific exper-
tise its appropriate evidentiary weight.
33
  Responding to concerns that the 
field of scientific evidence was beginning to amount to the legal equivalent 
of the Wild West, policymakers floated various structural solutions to the 
crisis.  Some argued to change the laws of evidence so that scientific exper-
tise would face greater scrutiny at the admissibility stage, thus preventing 
junk science from reaching the factfinder.
34
  Others suggested providing the 
factfinder with additional tools to facilitate a correct understanding of the 
strengths and weaknesses of scientific expertise.
35
  Still others suggested 
                                                          
 29.  Matt Clarke, Crime Labs in Crisis: Shoddy Forensics Used to Secure Convictions, 
PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Prison Legal News, W. Brattleboro, Vt.), Oct. 2010, at 1, available at 
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/includes/_public/_issues/pln_2010/10pln10.pdf. 
 30.  Id. at 18 (“[Fred] Zain was popular among prosecutors and police because the evidence 
he produced led to numerous convictions.  It was later learned that he testified about tests he 
didn’t do and for which the crime lab did not even have the equipment to perform.”).  
 31.  Id. 
 32.  See generally COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., NAT’L 
RES. COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 
xix (2009) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE] (proposing an agenda for progress 
in the forensic science community because “significant improvements” are needed to “serve socie-
ty more effectively”). 
 33.  See Jennifer F. Miller, Article, Should Juries Hear Complex Patent Cases?, 4 DUKE L. & 
TECH REV. 0004 (2004) (discussing the constitutionality of the complexity exception as applied to 
patent cases which would preclude jurors from hearing complex cases). 
 34.  See Douglas King, Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury 
Trial, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 588 (1984) (arguing that the laws of evidence in part “restricted the 
complexity of the cases that could be put before a jury”). 
 35.  See Nancy J. Brekke et al., Of Juries and Court-Appointed Experts: The Impact of Non-
adversarial Versus Adversarial Expert Testimony, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 451, 452, 454 (1993) 
(discussing the importance of adversial procedures and suggesting court-appointed experts to aid 
in jury understanding of complex issues). 
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bolder solutions, such as shrinking the pool of prospective experts to those 
whose credentials and methods could be vetted appropriately.
36
 
Perhaps the boldest of these reforms was to create a specialized sci-
ence court to evaluate complex scientific cases.
37
  Policymakers have pro-
posed different incarnations of the science court, but generally science 
courts would feature scientifically savvy factfinders taking evidence from 
specially vetted experts to decide complex cases demanding scientific 
knowledge.
38
  The problem for these proposals, however, was a simple one: 
despite their meteoric rise, they became increasingly unpopular.
39
  For a 
multitude of reasons, the science court failed to gain public traction or sup-
port from a majority of policymakers.
40
 
One reason why the science court failed to gain traction may be that 
policymakers were, as the cliché goes, “doing it wrong.”  Proposals for the 
science court are long on theory yet short on empirical support.  Empirical 
evidence might suggest that, at the outset, these proposals suffered from 
flawed designs.  In this Article, I will argue that the successful design of a 
legal decisionmaking body is a function of two discrete dimensions: people 
must believe that the body possesses decisional accuracy—the ability to 
correctly apply the appropriate law to the true facts of a dispute—and pos-
sesses procedural legitimacy—the ability of a decisionmaking system to 
provide citizens with a sense of voice in the proceedings.
41
  A legal institu-
tion that wishes to amass the greatest amount of popular support will max-
imize both of these values.
42
  The earlier science court proposals might have 
attempted to maximize decisional accuracy, but at a major cost: lowered 
perceptions of procedural legitimacy.
43
 
This Article is the first to support this claim with experimental data, 
and will use that data to design a science court that will prioritize citizens’ 
                                                          
 36.  See Victor W. Weedn, Ask Experts About Forensic Certification and Accreditation, 25 
CRIM. JUST. 48 (2010) (discussing accreditation and certification of experts and arguing it should 
be a basis “for judicial inquiry and testimonial foundation”). 
 37.  See Andrew W. Jurs, Science Court: Past Proposals, Current Considerations, and a 
Suggested Structure, 15 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 19 (2010) (proposing a science court to resolve cur-
rent forensics problems). 
 38.  Id. at 17–18 (discussing a suggestion that “[a] specially-qualified jury would be, as a 
general proposition, better than a normal jury . . . because formal education results in not only the 
direct development of skills or knowledge, but also the ability to transfer that knowledge to new 
tasks in new contexts”). 
 39.  Id. at 12–14 (explaining various criticisms of the science court model proposed in the 
1970s). 
 40.  Id. (explaining that “[l]ater critics . . . not[ed] that in the primary example of a science 
court ‘in action,’ the procedure failed”). 
 41.  See infra Part III. 
 42.  See infra Part IV. 
 43.  See infra Part IV. 
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perceptions of decisional accuracy and procedural legitimacy.
44
  Ultimately, 
I will argue that a redesigned science court that enjoys the greatest public 
support must include the following: (1) vetted, court-appointed experts in 
science court proceedings; (2) science-savvy judges and law clerks; (3) tri-
als by jury; and (4) the opportunity for vigorous cross-examination of the 
expert testimony by each party’s attorney.45  Toward that end, Part II of this 
Article will canvas the extent of the scientific evidence crisis, detail the 
proposed solutions, and provide an in-depth discussion of earlier science 
court proposals.  Part III will argue that earlier science court proposals 
failed to gain traction, in part, because they did not maximize public percep-
tions of decisional accuracy and procedural legitimacy.  Part IV will: (1) 
demonstrate empirically that perceptions of decisional accuracy and proce-
dural legitimacy are discrete psychological dimensions that are not neces-
sarily maximized in tandem; and (2) tease out the factors that affect public 
perceptions of accuracy and legitimacy.  Part V will argue for a redesigned 
science court and demonstrate empirically that the redesigned court would 
enjoy greater public support, greater perceived decisional accuracy, and 
greater perceived legitimacy than other methods for addressing the short-
comings of complex scientific evidence.  Part VI will conclude with impli-
cations of this new proposal for the viability of specialty courts and for the 
role of complex science in the courtroom; practical and philosophical objec-
tions to the proposal; and future directions for institutional design. 
II.  THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE CRISIS 
Sally Clark and Douglas Prade were not the only victims of scientific 
evidence gone awry.
46
  Recent history details several other instances in 
which faulty science has led to unjust outcomes including, in a controver-
sial case that made national headlines, death by lethal injection.
47
  Indeed, 
policymakers’ unease with scientific evidence—and forensic evidence in 
particular—came to a head in 2009, when the prestigious National Acade-
my of Sciences released a scathing report in which it sharply criticized the 
use of several types of scientific expertise in the courtroom.
48
  The problems 
                                                          
 44.  See infra Part IV. 
 45.  See infra Part V. 
 46.  See supra notes 1–28 and accompanying text. 
 47.  See Steve Mills, Cameron Todd Willingham Case: Expert Says Fire for Which Father 
Was Executed Was Not Arson, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 25, 2009, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-
08-25/news/0908240429_1_cameron-todd-willingham-texas-forensic-science-commission-
willingham-case (describing the case of Cameron Todd Willingham, who was executed based on 
potentially faulty forensic evidence). 
 48.  See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 32, at 8 (“The simple reality is that 
the interpretation of forensic evidence is not always based on scientific studies to determine its 
validity.  This is a serious problem.”). 
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associated with the use of forensic evidence in the courtroom are multifac-
eted and pervasive, and consist of dual failings: those of the forensic experts 
who testify and those of the courts that allow those experts to testify.
49
 
Forensic experts—that is, experts who examine evidence including 
hair shafts, ballistics, tool marks, fingerprints, and handwriting for potential 
matches to criminal suspects—shoulder considerable blame for the use of 
faulty scientific expertise in court.
50
  Perhaps surprisingly, most forensics 
admitted into evidence at trial lack sufficient scientific foundation; unlike 
academic disciplines that follow the scientific method—which focuses on 
the statistical falsification of theory-driven hypotheses—most forensic 
techniques do not rely on empirical testing at all.
51
  Moreover, forensic dis-
ciplines are not enshrouded in a research culture that values the publication 
of findings for review by other forensic analysts in the field.
52
  This is high-
ly unusual, because the peer review process is a hallmark of nearly every 
serious scientific discipline.
53
  Perhaps, then, it is unsurprising that many 
forensic experts have little formal scientific training and, more troubling, 
often work hand-in-hand with law enforcement personnel who retain them, 
creating financial incentives for these experts to skew their results—
consciously or subconsciously—to favor the government’s case.54 
The certainty with which forensic experts declare their conclusions 
serves as another way in which these experts contribute to the scientific ev-
idence crisis.
55
  Academic disciplines trained in the scientific method typi-
cally phrase their conclusions in the form of statistical probabilities (for ex-
ample, that the likelihood of seeing certain laboratory findings if those 
results were due to chance is one in twenty).
56
  With the notable exception 
                                                          
 49.  Id. at 9. 
 50.  Id. at 5–6, 57. 
 51.  Id.  For a thorough discussion of how to improve the field of forensic science through a 
research culture, see Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic 
Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 725, 734–35 (2011).  Moreover, instead of relying on the scientific 
method, forensic analysts frequently tout their wide-ranging “experience” when cross-examined 
about the validity of their analyses.  Id. at 745.  For example, a ballistics expert, in declaring that 
the bullet used to shoot someone originated from the defendant’s gun, might declare that her anal-
ysis is based on having examined hundreds of weapons over the course of many years; shocking-
ly, in some instances, a technician’s experience with knives was considered sufficient to validate 
her opinion that a match existed between the bullet that struck the victim and the defendant’s gun. 
 52.  Id. at 733–38. 
 53.  See id. at 743 (emphasizing that “transparency is a critical value of a functioning research 
culture”). 
 54.  See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009) (explaining forensic ana-
lysts’ incentives to alter evidence to favor the government’s case); see also Clarke, supra note 29 
(highlighting a real-world case of this incentive). 
 55.  See Mnookin et al., supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 56.  Id. at 742 (explaining that conclusions should be described based on the degree to which 
available data can support the claim and the degree to which confidence can be expressed). 
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of DNA experts, forensic experts phrase their conclusions in absolutes: the 
hair shafts, fingerprints, bullets, or bite marks either match or fail to match 
the defendant.
57
  These disciplines, however, are not rooted in empirical 
science (and the degree of agreement required for a “match” is variable 
across forensic disciplines).
58
 Therefore, there exists substantial risk that 
these conclusions are mistaken, and it is not obvious that factfinders ac-
count for this when weighing the evidence.
59
 
Many commentators believe that forensic science is an incoherent dis-
cipline that lacks the independence and robustness of true scientific disci-
plines.
60
  If courts—like these commentators—refuse to trust, wholesale, 
the conclusions reached by forensic experts, we could imagine that poten-
tially unjust outcomes might be minimized.
61
  Unfortunately, judges also 
shoulder the blame for potentially unjust outcomes in scientific cases.
62
  
Perhaps the most pervasive mistake judges make with respect to the admis-
sibility of scientific evidence is to equate the longstanding use of a forensic 
technique with its objective scientific validity.
63
  By deferring to preceden-
tial cases involving the same (or similar) forensic technique—and especial-
ly when deferring to non-controlling precedent from sister jurisdictions—
judges enshrine (and fortify) potentially unreliable scientific evidence into 
state and federal case law, making it even more difficult to challenge that 
evidence in the future.
64
  As discussed in more detail below, some commen-
tators and judges have called for structural reforms to the legal system—for 
example, to use current admissibility standards to more closely scrutinize 
expert testimony,
65
 expand the doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel 
to include attorneys who fail to challenge faulty forensic evidence that is 
admitted into court,
66
 and reexamine expert witness procedures to avoid a 
                                                          
 57.  See Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions 
of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 139 (2008) (illustrating how foren-
sic analysts’ rhetoric describes their conclusions in absolute terms). 
 58.  See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 32, at 6–7. 
 59.  Id. at 37. 
 60.  Id. at 35–37, 87. 
 61.  Id. at 87. 
 62.  Id. at 12–13. 
 63.  See Mnookin et al., supra note 51, at 747. 
 64.  Cf. United States v. Green, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D. Mass. 2004) (expressing frustration 
with the state of controlling bifurcation of juries case law). 
 65.  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (agreeing with peti-
tioners that the Frye test has since been “superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence”); see also Ruth Saunders, The Circuit Courts’ Application of Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 46 DRAKE L. REV. 407, 420 (1997) (discussing how the Second Circuit has 
criticized the focus of “the admissibility of expert testimony rather than sufficiency”). 
 66.  See Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scien-
tific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 76–77 (1998) (“Occasionally, defendants who have failed to 
challenge scientific evidence at trial attempt to raise the issue on appeal.”). 
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“battle of the hired-gun experts” in which multiple experts testify and con-
fuse the jury
67—but progress has been slow.68 
The debate over forensic evidence has reached a turning point.  In 
2009, in what may be considered the apotheosis of the movement to purify 
junk scientific evidence, the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) re-
leased a report titled, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: 
A Path Forward.
69
  The NAS Report, authored jointly by a committee com-
posed of law professors, scientists, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and 
judges, discussed the weaknesses associated with scientific evidence and 
proposed several recommendations to legal policymakers, including the 
creation of a federal agency to oversee the field of forensic science.
70
  
Courts have slowly begun to take notice of the NAS Report, but meaningful 
changes to their approach to scientific evidence are not yet evident.
71
  This 
inaction has engendered a rebirth of scholarship seeking solutions to the 
scientific evidence crisis generally,
72
 and a rebirth of the proposal for the 
science court specifically.
73
 
A.  In Search of Solutions 
An array of legal actors and policymakers has proposed structural so-
lutions to maintain the integrity of legal decisions that involve scientific ev-
idence.  Most of these proposals fall into camps that reflect two different 
perspectives of jurors’ abilities to evaluate complex information.  The first 
set of proposals is designed to shield the jury from potentially unreliable ev-
idence,
74
 while the second set is designed to give jurors the tools they need 
to sift through potentially unreliable evidence that is presented to them.
75
  
Different actors in the legal community—some majoritarian and others 
countermajoritarian—have presented different proposals with differing lev-
els of success.
76
 
                                                          
 67.  See Joel Cooper & Isaac M. Neuhaus, The “Hired Gun” Effect: Assessing the Effect of 
Pay, Frequency of Testifying, and Credentials on the Perception of Expert Testimony, 24 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 149, 150 (2000) (noting “it is likely that jurors will find [courtroom expert’s] testi-
mony difficult to comprehend and process”). 
 68.  See infra Part III. 
 69.  For the NAS Report, see STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 32.  
 70.  Id. at 18–33. 
 71.  Nancy Gertner, Commentary on the Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Scienc-
es, 58 UCLA L. REV. 789, 790–92 (2011). 
 72.  For a detailed discussion on reforming the scientific forensic evidence used in litigation, 
see STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 32. 
 73.  See Jurs, supra note 37, at 28–29 (proposing a rebirth of the science court). 
 74.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 75.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 76.  See infra Parts II.A.1–2. 
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1.  “Shield-the-Factfinder” Solutions 
The jury shield solution that has had the greatest impact on scientific 
trials in federal court came from the United States Supreme Court in its de-
cision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
77
  Under the Daub-
ert decision, the role of determining the validity and reliability of scientific 
expertise is no longer functionally outsourced to the scientific community; 
instead, the trial judge is tasked as the gatekeeper for ensuring that junk sci-
ence is not proffered to the jury.
78
  To guide judges in this new role, the 
Court announced several non-exhaustive factors for judges to consider 
when deciding whether to admit scientific expertise into evidence, includ-
ing whether the evidence is testable, has a known (or testable) error rate, 
has been subject to peer review, and enjoys the general acceptance of the 
scientific community.
79
 
The efficacy of the Daubert factors for maintaining the integrity of 
scientific evidence in the courtroom is unclear.  Critics have complained 
that the Daubert test affords judges wide discretion regarding which factors 
they use—and which they choose not to use—to determine whether scien-
tific expertise is sufficiently reliable, which causes the test to become so 
flexible that it is formless.
80
  This critique has had ripple effects that are 
myriad and varied.  Some researchers have argued that judges—consciously 
or subconsciously—have applied Daubert in unequal ways in criminal and 
civil trials, leading to inequitable outcomes.
81
  They argue that plaintiffs in 
civil trials, particularly toxic tort trials against major corporations, are much 
more likely to have their scientific evidence excluded,
82
 whereas forensic 
evidence used by prosecutors in criminal trials is routinely admitted into ev-
                                                          
 77.  509 U.S. 579 (1993); see STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 32, at 10 (“In 
sum, Daubert’s requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to ‘scientific knowledge’ estab-
lished a standard of ‘evidentiary reliability.’” (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 590 n.9, 595)). 
 78.  Before Daubert, the prevailing test for determining the reliability of expert testimony 
required judges to determine whether the scientific expertise at issue was generally accepted with-
in the relevant scientific community.  See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 
1923) (affirming the trial judge’s decision to exclude certain expert testimony). 
 79.  For an application of the Daubert framework, see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.  Many state 
courts later adopted the Daubert framework in their jurisdictions, as illustrated in Williams v. 
Hedican, 561 N.W.2d 817, 827–28 (Iowa 1997) and State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 388, 395 (Alas-
ka 1999).  See also Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Forensic Science: The Pitfalls of Law En-
forcement Control of Scientific Research, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 53, 60–64 (2011) (explaining the 
impact of Daubert on state and federal courts). 
 80.  See Peter B. Oh, The Proper Test for Assessing the Admissibility of Nonscientific Expert 
Evidence Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 437, 450 (1997) (discussing 
how courts have interpreted Daubert inconsistently). 
 81.  See LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING 
EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT DECISION 25–29 (2002) (ex-
amining “how frequently evidence is found unreliable” in the time since Daubert). 
 82.  Id. at 28–29. 
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idence, despite significant concerns within the scientific community over 
the validity of those forensic techniques.
83
  Other researchers have criticized 
the ability of judges to understand and correctly apply the Daubert factors.  
A recent study suggests that although state judges understand and can apply 
the Daubert factors that were relevant to the Frye-era inquiry regarding sci-
entific evidence—whether it has been peer reviewed and enjoys the support 
of the scientific community—these judges failed to understand and apply 
correctly the concepts of scientific testability and error rates.
84
  Still others 
criticize the heterogeneity of verdicts that results under Daubert because of 
the abuse of discretion standard that prevails on appeal.
85
 
Majoritarian bodies such as legislatures have also proposed jury-
shielding measures designed to bolster the credibility of scientific evidence 
in the courtroom.  In addition to amending Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to 
largely reflect the Supreme Court’s Daubert decision, Federal Rule 701 sets 
up a dividing line between lay witness opinion and expert opinion, which is 
subject to greater scrutiny.
86
  Federal Rule 703 provides a framework for 
limiting the basis of an admissible expert’s opinion, for example, by limit-
ing it only to information upon which experts in the relevant field would 
routinely rely.
87
 
The Rules of Evidence, like the Daubert test, also suffer from several 
drawbacks and criticisms.  The line between lay witness opinion and expert 
opinion as described in Federal Rule of Evidence 701 can be murky, which 
may allow for an expert ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’ to testify to scientific ex-
pertise under the guise of an unvetted lay witness.
88
  Rule 702 falls prey to 
the same interpretation problems that affect the Supreme Court’s Daubert 
decision, including the selective application and misapplication of admissi-
                                                          
 83.  See Giannelli, supra note 79, at 64–65 (noting that post-Daubert decisions raised con-
cerns in the scientific community “about how science was being used in criminal cases”). 
 84.  See Beecher-Monas, supra note 66, at 68–72 (noting that despite efforts to explain scien-
tific principles and error rates to judges, “[i]n the four years since Daubert, the results admittedly 
have been uneven”). 
 85.  Compare Easum v. Miller, 92 P.3d 794, 803–04 (Wyo. 2004) (reversing and remanding 
the lower court’s decision and holding the accuracy of the doctor’s differential diagnosis is a jury 
question), with Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 279 (5th Cir. 1998) (on comparable 
facts, upholding the trial court’s ruling excluding the expert testimony). 
 86.  See FED. R. EVID. 701 (detailing the distinction between lay witness opinion and expert 
opinion and characterizing lay opinion as “not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge”). 
 87.  See FED. R. EVID. 703 (“If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those 
kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the 
opinion to be admitted.”). 
 88.  See Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV. 699, 769 (1998) (“Yet this lais-
sez-faire attitude runs the risk of permitting a party to evade the Daubert requirements through the 
simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay witness clothing.”). 
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bility criteria.
89
  Judges also have different conceptions of the scope of Rule 
703, and frequently disagree on whether an expert’s opinion relies upon in-
formation that is routinely relied upon in that expert’s field.90 
In sum, measures designed to keep potentially unreliable scientific ev-
idence from the factfinder through the promulgation of tougher admissibil-
ity standards have met with mixed success.  But other measures have been 
suggested that take a different approach, consistent with a different view of 
the factfinder’s ability to analyze complex scientific evidence. 
2.  “Assist-the-Factfinder” Solutions 
Other solutions for improving the integrity of trials involving scientific 
evidence have been proposed by policymakers who believe that, instead of 
withholding such evidence from factfinders entirely, factfinders should be 
provided with appropriate tools to better understand the evidence.  Perhaps 
the most controversial of these solutions are the aptly-named “jury trial in-
novations” which have largely originated from researchers at the Arizona 
Jury Project.
91
  Drawing from empirical findings in social psychology, these 
proposals change the factfinder’s role from passive observer to active par-
ticipant.
92
  For example, the researchers advocate allowing jurors to take 
notes during complex trials, ask clarification questions to witnesses, and 
discuss the case with each other before deliberating.
93
  They also advocate 
simplifying jury instructions, limiting the amount of time each party can 
present evidence in one sitting, using demonstrative evidence to clarify dif-
ficult scientific concepts, and allowing jurors to engage in some degree of 
deliberation before casting their votes in the case.
94
  These policymakers 
                                                          
 89.  Id. at 713. 
 90.  Id. at 774–78. 
 91.  See Justin Sevier, The Unintended Consequences of Local Rules, 21 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 291, 293 (2011) (discussing the “jury trial innovations”). 
 92.  Id. at n.4. 
 93.  Id.; see generally JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS (G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997). 
 94.  See Martin J. Bourgeois et al., Nominal and Interactive Groups: Effects of Preinstruction 
and Deliberations on Decisions and Evidence Recall in Complex Trials, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
58, 58 (1995) (proposing that substantive preinstruction to juries before deliberation “may en-
hance jurors’ competence in complex cases”); Neil P. Cohen, The Timing of Jury Instructions, 67 
TENN. L. REV. 681, 681 (2000) (advocating for a neutral standard in limiting timing of jury in-
structions based on helpfulness and administrability); B. Michael Dann et al., Can Jury Trial In-
novations Improve Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence?, 90 JUDICATURE 152, 155 (2007) 
(suggesting that notetaking helps jurors remember and understand the case); Shari Seidman Dia-
mond et al., Juror Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (2003) (introducing the implications of jurors discussing the trial together before delib-
erations); Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-First Century, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 449, 454–55 (2006) (suggesting a change in jury instructions based on empirical 
evidence that most are difficult for jurors to understand); Nicole L. Mott, The Current Debate on 
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reason that, to the extent that courts can streamline the evidence presented 
to jurors and allow jurors to enter deliberations with a clear understanding 
of the evidence, jurors’ ability to accurately and equitably decide cases in-
volving scientific evidence should be improved.
95
 
This approach, however, faces limitations.  Although the Arizona Jury 
Project has made great strides in getting policymakers to consider outside-
the-box solutions to the scientific evidence crisis, the empirical findings are 
complex at best.
96
  For example, some of these findings are the result of 
self-reported perceptions of competency and not with actual efficacy;
97
 
those that do examine the actual efficacy of these jury trial innovations are 
often difficult to interpret;
98
 and some of these innovations might lead to 
unintended consequences that suggest these innovations might be less effi-
cacious than the research suggests.
99
  Moreover, the manner in which these 
innovations have been implemented is potentially troubling. Innovations 
such as jury notetaking fall under the purview of local court rules, which are 
largely unregulated and unstandardized; some judges experiment with them 
while others do not.
100
  This may lead to serious concerns of accuracy and 
equity if two identically situated litigants face different decisionmakers and 
receive different verdicts.
101
 
Alternatively, policymakers have proposed solutions to aid judges in 
their understanding of scientific expertise that is admitted into evidence.  
Each of these solutions is controversial, and focuses on the nature of the 
expert involved in the case.  Under Federal Rule of Evidence 706, the court 
may, on the motion of the parties or on its own motion, appoint an expert 
witness of its own choosing (or one that the parties have nominated) in ad-
dition to any experts that the parties have proffered.
102
  More controversial-
ly, the court also has the power under its inherent authority to engage the 
services of a technical advisor, a shadow expert who does not testify at tri-
                                                          
Juror Questions: “To Ask or Not to Ask, That Is the Question,” 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1099, 1099 
(2003) (discussing whether jurors should or should not be able to ask questions during trial). 
 95.  Marder, supra note 94, at 498. 
 96.  Sevier, supra note 91, at 338. 
 97.  Id. at 312–13. 
 98.  See Diamond et al., supra note 94, at 40 (acknowledging that “it is difficult to provide a 
quantitative assessment” of a study of jurors due to the “disparate fact patterns and different sets 
of jurors”). 
 99.  Sevier, supra note 91, at 338. 
 100.  Id. at 339. 
 101.  Id. at 340. 
 102.  FED. R. EVID. 706.  For a thorough discussion of Rule 706 jurisprudence see Sophia 
Cope, Ripe for Revision: A Critique of Federal Rule of Evidence 706 and the Use of Court-
Appointed Experts, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 163, 165–66 (2004) (arguing that “a revision of Rule 706 is 
necessary given that science and technology continue to advance and become more complex, thus 
presenting judges and juries with increasingly challenging cases”). 
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al—and whose identity need not be disclosed by the judge—who educates 
the judge with respect to the scientific issues involved in the case.
103
  Per-
haps most controversially, policymakers have proposed that judges consult 
with panels of several experts to create expert pools of scientifically and ju-
dicially vetted experts whose services may be needed by parties to litigation 
in that judge’s court.104 
Judges, however, rarely implement these proposals.
105
  Although no 
empirical study has been done, judges are likely reluctant to use these tools 
because (1) other judges do not use them; and (2) they might be concerned 
that imposing on the trial an expert of their choosing and forcing the parties 
to choose from a pre-selected group of experts, or using an “off the grid” 
expert who is unknown to both parties, raises serious issues of procedural 
fairness and due process.
106
 
There is, however, one other controversial solution that was proposed 
in the early 1970s and stirred vigorous debate over the course of two dec-
ades.
107
  This proposal would remove especially complex scientific trials 
from courts of general jurisdiction into a tribunal that is specially designed 
to efficiently and accurately adjudicate these disputes.
108
  This proposal 
came to be known as the “science court.”109  Its complex history, the debate 
that it inspired, and its failure to ultimately gain traction provide an educa-
tional case study in institutional design.
110
  But beyond that, in an era in 
which significant swaths of scientific evidence have come under attack 
from legal actors, academics, and other policymakers, a redesigned science 
court might be the solution for which these policymakers are searching. 
B.  The Science Court 
The science court proved to be the most controversial of the proposals 
to ensure the integrity of scientific evidence in American trials,
111
 and for 
                                                          
 103.  For a discussion of a court-appointed advisor’s inherent power see Sofia Adrogué & Alan 
Ratliff, The Independent Expert Evolution: From the “Path of Least Resistance” to the “Road 
Less Traveled?”, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 843, 885 (2003) (exploring the various provisions gov-
erning a special master under Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 104.  MICHAEL J. SAKS & RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN 
LITIGATION 95–96 (1983). 
 105.  STEPHEN BREYER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 7–8 (2d ed. 2000), 
available at https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/sciman00.pdf. 
 106.  Jurs, supra note 37, at 21–24. 
 107.  Id. at 2–3. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 3. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  See John Noble Wilford, Science Considers Its Own ‘Court,’ N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1976, 
at E8 (discussing alternative proposals and summarizing some of the most controversial issues 
relating to the science court). 
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good reason.  Rather than simply shielding certain types of evidence from 
factfinders or giving them tools to better evaluate scientific evidence within 
the status quo and adversarial model of legal decisionmaking, the science 
court would alter the process of making decisions about scientific evidence 
entirely.  Proponents of the science court argue for creating an entirely sep-
arate court with special jurisdiction to hear complex scientific disputes, with 
either “special” judges or “special” jurors making the decisions.112 
The specialty court as a decisionmaking institution has been slowly 
gaining momentum since the founding of the Republic.
113
  For example, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery, established in 1792, is considered the preemi-
nent decisionmaking body to adjudicate disputes arising out of complex 
business transactions.
114
  Moreover, the popularity of specialized business 
courts has risen steadily, with many states currently creating specialized 
business courts within their jurisdiction.
115
  Similar trends are evident in the 
area of patent and trademark disputes.
116
  The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit, established in 1982, is widely considered to be 
the benchmark in legal decisionmaking over intellectual property matters;
117
 
and like its business court counterpart, it too has spawned intellectual prop-
erty specialization in various state and federal district courts.
118
  And final-
ly, commentators have described the United States Bankruptcy Court, 
which was established in 1978 and has jurisdiction over all cases arising 
under the United States Bankruptcy Code, as “a success by all measures”119 
and “an example of successful specialized adjudication.”120 
Against this background, it is conceivable that a specialized science 
court—if it were designed to maximize its acceptance by the public—could 
enjoy a similar degree of success.  To understand why the previous science 
court proposals ultimately failed to muster sufficient popular and political 
                                                          
 112.  Jurs, supra note 37, at 9–10. 
 113.  Id. at 24. 
 114.  Id.; see also Anne Tucker Nees, Making a Case for Business Courts: A Survey of and 
Proposed Framework to Evaluate Business Courts, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 477, 480–82 (2007) 
(discussing history of business courts). 
 115.  Jurs, supra note 37, at 25; see also The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (illustrating the structure and success of a specialized bankruptcy court). 
 116.  See Matthew G. Jacobs & Michael S. Mireles, The Intersection of Intellectual Property 
and Antitrust Law: In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation, 15 TRANSNAT’L 
LAW. 293, 297 (2002) (describing the creation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals). 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  See, e.g., Nancy Olson, Does Practice Make Perfect? An Examination of Congress’s 
Proposed District Court Patent Pilot Program, 55 UCLA L. REV. 745, 747–49 (2008) (discussing 
patent specialization trends in U.S. courts). 
 119.  Jurs, supra note 37, at 26. 
 120.  REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 74 (1990), reprinted in 22 CONN. 
L. REV. 733 (1990). 
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support, it is worth first examining their components and the sociocultural 
forces that led to them. 
1.  The Precursor: The “Political” Science Court 
The turbulent 1960s and ‘70s proved to be a microcosm for change 
and upheaval.
121
  This was also true with respect to public scientific dis-
course.
122
  In the late 1960s, there was growing discontent that discussions 
about science as it related to public policy were becoming increasingly po-
liticized and obfuscated by adversaries in the political debate.
123
  In re-
sponse to this growing problem, Arthur Kantrowitz wrote two influential 
articles that appeared in Science and the American Scientist advocating for a 
process that would “institutionalize” the debate over scientific issues and 
free that debate from political and sociocultural distortion.
124
  His proposal 
would later come to be known as a political “science court.”125 
The crux of Kantrowitz’s proposal in Science was threefold.126  First, 
the political “science court” would purify scientific debate by teasing out 
questions of objective scientific fact from those that involve political and 
cultural value judgments.
127
  Second, the court would consist of experts—
separate from advocates—who would devote their time and resources to 
evaluating those objective scientific facts.
128
  Third, the results from the sci-
ence court’s decision would be published and available for public review.129 
Kantrowitz tweaked this model when he proposed this idea a few years 
later in the American Scientist.
130
  Most importantly (and controversially), 
he included an element of cross-examination in his modified proposal, in 
                                                          
 121.  See, e.g., Allan Mazur, The Science Court: Reminiscence and Retrospective, 4 RISK 161, 
161 (1993) (depicting the post-Watergate era as “a contentious time with debates in all arenas flar-
ing one month and fading a short time later”). 
 122.  See id. (noting the “combative stance” adopted by many in the fields of natural and social 
sciences). 
 123.  See id. at 161–62 (“To the public (including me), technical expertise seemed no more 
reliable than psychiatric witnesses in a courtroom whose ‘scientific objectivity’ often has the ap-
pearance of a chimera.”).  
 124.  See, e.g., Arthur Kantrowitz, Proposal for an Institution for Scientific Judgment, 156 SCI. 
763, 763–64 (1967) [hereinafter Kantrowitz, Proposal] (recommending a threefold proposal to 
institutionalize a decisionmaking process shielded from ethico-political norm encroachment but 
open to public commentary); see also Arthur Kantrowitz, Controlling Technology Democratically, 
63 AM. SCIENTIST 505, 508 (1975) [hereinafter Kantrowitz, Controlling Technology] (proposing 
that “Congress create, on an experimental basis, an institution for scientific judgment”). 
 125.  See Mazur, supra note 121, at 164 (noting that Kantrowitz “never cared for the name”). 
 126.  See Kantrowitz, Proposal, supra note 124, at 763 (offering three recommendations to 
help address the problematic politicization of science). 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 763–64. 
 129.  Id. at 764. 
 130.  See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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which science advocates would be permitted to expose weaknesses in their 
adversary’s evidence.131  This set the stage for a lengthy and high-profile 
debate over how to evaluate science in the public discourse.
132
 
Kantrowitz’s proposal enjoyed political momentum in the period be-
fore the election of 1976.
133
  President Ford supported the proposal and his 
administration created a task force to evaluate the proposal further.
134
  This 
task force released a favorable interim report, made recommendations to re-
fine the proposal, and announced its intention to convene a public hearing 
on the science court, in which legal and scientific policymakers could 
comment on the proposal more fully.
135
 
In the fall of 1976, just two months before the presidential election, the 
task force convened a contentious public hearing in Leesburg, Virginia.
136
  
Among the various suggestions from the participants was the need for a 
“test case” to examine the viability of a political science court.137  That may 
have been, however, all upon which the participants agreed.
138
  Significant 
criticisms of the political science court emerged ranging from the philo-
sophical—for example, doubt that objective scientific facts could really be 
separated from sociopolitical questions of morality,
139
 and a concern that 
providing “finality” to scientific disputes is anathema to the scientific 
method
140—to the practical—for example, a concern that incorporating 
cross-examination would increase expenses and interfere with the process 
of determining the “true” scientific facts.141  Bluntly, critics of the political 
science court labeled it “profoundly naïve, internally inconsistent, and in-
herently unworkable.”142 
Despite the proposal’s broad-based support, as the 1976 presidential 
election passed and the Ford Administration gave way to President James 
                                                          
 131.  See Kantrowitz, Controlling Technology, supra note 124, at 507.  For a defense of the 
Kantrowitz proposal in the context of extending many of its elements into legal proceedings, see 
John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 563–65 (1978). 
 132.  See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 133.  See Mazur, supra note 121, at 163–65 (highlighting the political support received by the 
science court during the Ford Administration). 
 134.  Id. at 163. 
 135.  Id. at 164–65. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 165.  
 138.  Id. 
 139.  See Jurs, supra note 37, at 12 (describing challenges to the idea that scientific facts can 
be effectively separated from political and moral value judgments); see also Wilford, supra note 
111 (noting criticisms including that judges cannot be trusted to be impartial and that deci-
sionmaking processes cannot escape a value-judgment component). 
 140.  See Jurs, supra note 37, at 14 (describing critics’ fears “that the court would bring an au-
thoritarian finality to scientific inquiry” that would hinder debate).  
 141.  Id. at 13. 
 142.  Id. at 12. 
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Carter’s administration, political winds shifted against the political “science 
court.”143  The Carter Administration was much less enthusiastic about the 
proposal, and the test case for the proposal never materialized.
144
  As quick-
ly as it began, the political “science court” experiment had ended. 
2.  The Proposal: The “Judicial” Science Court 
Although the political science court stalled as the nation headed into 
the Reagan-era 1980s, a new permutation of the court was incubating.  The 
proposal for a science court in the political arena may have encountered 
lofty philosophical roadblocks, including its likely inability to tease out ob-
jective scientific facts from moral and political questions,
145
 but it was not 
clear that this problem would be relevant to evaluating legal disputes over 
scientific evidence.  This led legal researchers to the conclusion that a judi-
cial science court might be different in kind from a body that adjudicates 
science disputes in the political realm.
146
  The proposal for the judicial sci-
ence court was born. 
The judicial science court actually consisted of two distinct proposals 
that can be thought of as variations on the same central theme: select the 
factfinder—whether the factfinder is a judge or a jury—for scientific exper-
tise.  The proposals sought to accomplish this goal, however, in markedly 
different ways.  The first science court proposal, by William Luneburg and 
Mark Nordenberg, came in 1981.
147
  Luneburg and Nordenberg actually of-
fered twin designs.
148
  The first design would require juries in complex sci-
entific cases to be composed not of a purely representative cross-section of 
the local community, but rather of a special “blue ribbon” jury consisting of 
college-educated men and women.
149
  Luneberg and Nordenberg argued 
that by “specializing” the jury in these cases, the law could increase deci-
sional accuracy while preserving—at least in some sense—the important 
procedural safeguard of having a trial by jury.
150
 
                                                          
 143.  See Mazur, supra note 121, at 165 (explaining that although the Carter Administration 
was not “hostile” to the notion of a science court, it “had other priorities”). 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 146.  See William V. Luneburg & Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert 
Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 
VA. L. REV. 887, 942 (1981) (suggesting that “[t]he use of special juries . . . could strike a sensible 
compromise if selection procedures were designed to improve juror competence without so dra-
matically altering the jury’s make-up that it is deprived of its distinguishing characteristics”). 
 147.  See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 148.  Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 146, at 899. 
 149.  Id. at 899 n.63, 942–50. 
 150.  Id. at 947–48. 
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The proposal was bold but problematic, and the problems were both 
practical and philosophical.  In federal and state court, the pool from which 
potential jurors are selected—the jury “venire”—is required to consist of a 
representative cross-section of the surrounding community.
151
  To under-
stand why courts routinely require the jury pool to be representative re-
quires thinking about why jury trials exist at all.  Although one function of 
the jury is to root out “the facts of the matter” through rigorous debate 
among multiple people,
152
 this is not the jury’s sole function.  The jury can 
also be conceived of as a buffer against a potentially overreaching govern-
ment and one that passes judgments imbued with the common sense values 
of the local community.
153
  If we think of juries that way, Luneburg and 
Nordenberg’s proposal becomes controversial for posing a threat against 
this buffer and the common sense arguably reflected in cross-sectional rep-
resentation.
154
  Moreover, other commentators have noted the practical dif-
ficulty of selecting juries consisting solely of college-educated jurors, par-
ticularly in rural state-court jurisdictions.
155
  Perhaps because of these 
formidable philosophical and practical difficulties, this portion of Luneburg 
and Nordenberg’s proposal failed to gain traction.156 
Perhaps anticipating the difficulties associated with blue ribbon, col-
lege-educated juries deciding complex scientific cases, Luneburg and Nor-
denberg offered an alternative proposal.
157
  This proposal, however, proved 
to be even more controversial.  Luneburg and Nordenberg proposed elimi-
nating the jury altogether in complex scientific civil trials and instead re-
quiring the dispute to be adjudicated by panels of qualified, science-savvy 
administrative judges.
158
  On its face, this approach may appear patently un-
                                                          
 151.  Id. at 916–22 (tracing Supreme Court history of the affirmation of the requirement of 
cross-sectionalism in jury selection).  
 152.  See Jeffrey Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 125, 125 
(1998) (describing how the jury is often pointed to as exemplar of the deliberative democratic ide-
al). 
 153.  See JEFFREY B. ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF 
DEMOCRACY 31–32 (2000) (citing the colonial view of jury members as protectors of citizens’ 
rights and suggestion that “local knowledge of the condition of the people compensated for the 
lack of formal legal training”). 
 154.  See supra note 149 and accompanying text.  
 155.  See Jarod S. Gonzalez, A Custom Fit: Tailoring Texas Civil Jury Selection Procedures to 
Case Tiers, 43 ST. MARY’S L.J. 495, 551 (2012) (noting, however, that this notion helps fashion a 
case for smaller jury panels). 
 156.  See Jurs, supra note 37, at 3 (“Since the demise of Kantrowitz’s proposal in the late 
1970’s, legal scholars [including Luneburg and Nordenberg] have proposed several other, more 
limited, science court systems with varying structures and subjects, but the issue has faded and has 
received limited scholarly consideration for several decades.”). 
 157.  Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 146, at 950–51 (introducing the proposal of the use 
of expert nonjury tribunals). 
 158.  See id. at 950–52 (describing the proposal for expert nonjury tribunals). 
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constitutional, but historically there has been a real debate over whether to 
take complex cases away from the jury and put them in the hands of spe-
cialized judges.
159
  This debate has received increased attention recently 
both in the United States and abroad.
160
 
In England, for example, a 2007 bill to eliminate the jury in cases in-
volving complex fraud transactions passed the British House of Commons 
before ultimately being defeated in the House of Lords.
161
  In the United 
States, the Supreme Court created significant confusion in the lower courts 
when, in a footnote in its decision in Ross v. Bernhard,
162
 it stated that the 
application of the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial depends on, 
among other things, “the practical abilities and limitations of juries.”163  
This footnote caused considerable heartburn in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
for the Third and Ninth Circuits, which interpreted the Supreme Court’s 
language very differently.
164
  Later Supreme Court opinions have not fully 
clarified the state of the law,
165
 and considerable scholarly debate continues 
regarding whether jurors’ cognitive capacity is a legitimate basis by which 
to limit the federal right to a civil jury trial.
166
  Nonetheless, the instability 
of the law regarding the Seventh Amendment jury trial was likely a con-
tributing factor to the failure of Luneburg and Nordenberg’s alternative 
proposal to gain public support. 
The second science court proposal came from Troyen Brennan in the 
late 1980s.
167
  Brennan’s model was similar to Luneburg and Nordenberg’s 
model, but was much more specialized.
168
  Brennan argued for a scientific 
complexity “carve out” from trial by jury to a panel of administrative judg-
                                                          
 159.  See Miller, supra note 33, ¶¶ 19–21 (describing colonial support for a version of the 
complexity exception). 
 160.  Id. ¶ 1. 
 161.  Lords Defeat No-Jury Trials Plan, BBC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2007, 21:37 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6472755.stm. 
 162.  396 U.S. 531 (1970). 
 163.  Id. at 538. 
 164.  Compare In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(holding, post-Ross, that the abilities and limits of jurors may be a limiting condition of suits sub-
ject to the Seventh Amendment), with In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 425 (9th Cir. 
1979) (finding that one footnote is not enough to protect the complexity exception as constitution-
al). 
 165.  See, e.g., Weltzin v. Nail, 618 N.W.2d 293, 298 (Iowa 2000) (narrowing the applicability 
of Bernhard because the Seventh Amendment is not incorporated against the states). 
 166.  See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some Proposals Regard-
ing Alternative Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific Evidence in Common Law Courts, 
51 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 62–71 (1989) (defending in detail a science board proposal). 
 167.  Id. at 2–3. 
 168.  Id. (clarifying that “I will restrict myself to problems of causation which arise when sci-
entific evidence is presented to courts by expert witnesses.  My specific task will be to outline 
some realistic alternatives for helping judges and juries evaluate the scientific causal connec-
tions”). 
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es not in all scientifically complex cases, but in a discrete area of the law: 
toxic torts.
169
  Brennan argued that, as an empirical matter, toxic tort cases 
are particularly susceptible to decisional errors by jurors, and so an admin-
istrative or regulatory body could give coherence to this area of law by im-
proving the efficiency, accuracy, and consistency of verdicts involving tox-
ic torts.
170
  Brennan’s proposal, however, was in many ways a smaller-scale 
version of Luneburg and Nordenberg’s proposal, and suffered from many of 
the same drawbacks.
171
  Perhaps it is no surprise that Brennan’s proposal 
also failed to garner significant popular appeal. 
In sum, the judicial science court—modeled on Kantrowitz’s proposal 
of a “political” science court—would focus primarily on improving the ac-
curacy of legal decisions not by “purifying” the evidence that enters the 
court, but by selecting decisionmakers with a propensity to more carefully 
and correctly evaluate complex scientific evidence.  This proposal has 
failed to gain popular support and continues to remain a distant possibility 
for how to resolve the rising scientific evidence crisis in American courts.
172
  
As I argue below, this approach to the science court was too narrow in 
scope, failed to consider (as a matter of institutional design) the psychologi-
cal factors that lead the public to support decisionmaking bodies, and failed 
to maximize those factors accordingly.  The next section lays out the 
framework for this argument and then tests it empirically through a series of 
original experiments. 
III.  WHY THE SCIENCE COURT PROPOSAL FAILED 
The science court experiment did not have to fail.  But the proposal, 
although well intentioned and innovative, was ultimately blind to principles 
of psychology that would have lent it considerable popular legitimacy.  I 
detail those psychological principles below. 
A.  Acceptance as a Function of Accuracy and Legitimacy 
The science court proposals of the 1970s and 1980s shared a common 
thread, which proved to be their biggest drawback.  The proposals sought to 
improve the ability of the decisionmaker—through blue ribbon juries or 
panels of expert judges—to make smarter decisions about scientific evi-
dence.  But these proposed improvements came with substantial tradeoffs.  
Important procedural safeguards would be eliminated, including the repre-
                                                          
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. at 19–20. 
 171.  See Jurs, supra note 37, at 18–19 (explaining how, like the predecessor Luneburg and 
Nordenberg proposal, the Brennan proposal did not ultimately receive significant consideration). 
 172.  See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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sentative jury or, alternatively, the jury trial altogether.  Moreover, the pro-
posals would have scaled back these procedural safeguards and would have 
done little to change the quality of the input to the decisionmaker—the evi-
dence itself.  Thus, in addition to reducing litigants’ procedural protections, 
the proposals would not have maximized the ability of the science court to 
issue accurate decisions. 
To explore how the architects of the science court got it wrong, we 
should think of decisionmaking systems along a continuum in which, at one 
extreme, the parties have complete control over the inputs—the presentation 
of the evidence—to the decisionmaker, and at the other extreme, the deci-
sionmaker retains complete control over the inputs by gathering evidence 
without the assistance of attorneys.
173
  The American trial model—which 
we call the adversarial model because each party’s adversary produces its 
own evidence and reveals the weaknesses of his opponent’s evidence174—is 
closer on the continuum to the former, while the inquisitorial model favored 
by foreign countries—in which judges appoint their own experts or investi-
gators to collect the evidence that is evaluated
175—is closer on the continu-
um to the latter.
176
  To the extent that science court proposals move away 
from the pure adversarial model (consisting of the traditional trial by jury) 
toward a more inquisitorial design, policymakers should examine whether 
the move along this continuum necessitates a trade-off between competing 
values.  I argue that this is indeed what occurs; as policymakers design a 
system that moves from a more adversarial paradigm to one that contains 
elements of the inquisitorial paradigm, policymakers are choosing between 
two distinct psychological values: decisional accuracy and procedural legit-
imacy.
177
 
Decisional accuracy refers to the ability of a factfinder to apply the 
correct facts to the applicable law.
178
  Legal scholars have argued that the 
ability of a factfinding paradigm to produce decisionally accurate decisions 
                                                          
 173.  See generally JOHN W. THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 1–5 (1st ed. 1976) (describing and analyzing studies focused on the 
distribution of control in dispute resolution). 
 174.  See generally Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, 1 CHAP. 
L. REV. 57, 57–58 (1998) (describing the United States’ adversarial system). 
 175.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1846 (9th ed. 2009) (defining inquisitorial system). 
 176.  See Freedman, supra note 174, at 74 (noting that the “lawyers’ role is minimal” in the 
inquisitorial model). 
 177.  See infra Part VI. 
 178.  See John J. Capowski, Accuracy and Consistency in Categorical Decision-Making: A 
Study of Social Security’s Medical-Vocational Guidelines—Two Birds with One Stone or Pigeon-
Holing Claimants?, 42 MD. L. REV. 329, 331–32 (1983) (“Accuracy can be defined as the proper 
substantive outcome in a case based upon correctly found facts appropriately applied to the proper 
standard of law.”). 
  
794 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:770 
is not equal across the decisionmaking continuum.
179
  Scholars have sug-
gested that an inquisitorial paradigm, in which an unbiased factfinder gath-
ers evidence by appointing impartial investigators and expert witnesses, is 
likely to lead to greater decisionmaking accuracy than does the adversarial 
paradigm.
180
  These scholars argue that, because biased advocates control 
the presentation of the evidence in the adversarial paradigm, the evidence 
that the factfinder considers is biased to a degree that cross-examination—
one of the central features of the adversarial model—cannot adequately 
remedy.
181
 
Differential control over the evidence is precisely what distinguishes 
the adversarial and inquisitorial systems with respect to the related, but dis-
tinct, concept of procedural legitimacy.
182
  Procedural legitimacy refers to 
the willingness of a litigant to abide by a decisionmaker’s judgment inde-
pendent of the outcome of the dispute.
183
  As discussed in more detail in 
Section III.C, scholars argue that because litigants in the adversarial sys-
tem—compared to the inquisitorial system—have greater control over the 
presentation of the evidence, they will perceive the decisionmaker to be 
more procedurally legitimate, which, in turn, will make them more likely to 
abide by those decisions.
184
 
Thus, the figure below illustrates the relationship between the inquisi-
torial and adversarial decisionmaking systems as a function of these two 
distinct psychological concepts.  Moving across the Cartesian plane from 
left to right signifies an increase in a decisionmaking paradigm’s procedural 
legitimacy, while moving from the bottom to the top of the plane symboliz-
es increased decisional accuracy.  Thus, to use an extreme example, deci-
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sionmaking bodies such as the ordeals of the middle ages—which today’s 
scholars believe to signify virtually no procedural legitimacy or decisional 
accuracy—would fall in the bottom left of the plane.  A “pure” inquisitorial 
system, which I hypothesize increases perceptions of decisional accuracy 
but decreases perceptions of procedural legitimacy, would fall in the top left 
of the plane.  A “pure” adversarial system, however, would fall in the lower 
right of the plane, because it increases perceptions of procedural legitimacy 
at the cost of perceived decisional accuracy.  Finally, an ideal decisionmak-
ing paradigm, which I argue embodies elements of both the adversarial and 
inquisitorial systems, would fall in the upper-right corner of the plane. 
 
In sum, my argument—which I support with empirical evidence from 
original experiments
185—is that different decisionmaking paradigms high-
light different psychological values.
186
  Thus, the science court proposal that 
will enjoy the greatest public support will include both adversarial and in-
quisitorial features. 
Before reporting the results of the four original experiments I offer in 
support of my proposal, it is worth briefly discussing what exactly is meant 
by the terms “decisional accuracy” and “procedural legitimacy,” delineating 
their component parts, and discussing how different decisionmaking sys-
tems are likely to differ on those dimensions. 
                                                          
 185.  See infra Part IV. 
 186.  See infra Part V. 
  
796 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:770 
B.  Decisional Accuracy 
Decisional accuracy is defined as the ability of the factfinder to apply 
the correct facts to the appropriate law when making legal decisions.
187
  The 
process of making accurate decisions is two-fold and exceedingly diffi-
cult.
188
  First, the factfinder must make correct determinations about the 
facts, which proves to be a challenging, multi-step endeavor.
189
  The fact-
finder must first correctly comprehend all of the facts of the case.
190
  From 
there, the factfinder must choose which facts are the most relevant to re-
solving the dispute and which are not.
191
  Beyond that, the factfinder must 
also decide which relevant facts are credible and which are not.
192
  And 
even then, the factfinder must decide which version of the competing narra-
tives about those relevant, credible facts is the most likely to be true.
193
  
Any mistake at any point in this process diminishes the factfinder’s ability 
to render an accurate decision.
194
 
Second, even if the factfinder successfully creates a narrative that ac-
curately reflects the true facts of the legal dispute, the factfinder must then 
apply these facts to the law.
195
  Again, difficulties abound.
196
  The factfinder 
first must correctly identify the law or laws that govern the dispute.
197
  The 
factfinder must then not only comprehend the meaning of the law, but also 
must understand how to apply its principles to the facts of the case.
198
  Fi-
nally, the factfinder must be able to translate the application of the correct 
law to the correct facts into an appropriate verdict.
199
  As before, any mis-
take in this process—or in the fact-evaluation process—jeopardizes the 
factfinder’s likelihood of rendering an accurate decision.200 
This multi-step process of achieving decisional accuracy is fraught 
with peril.
201
  This likely explains why behavioral researchers have found, 
frequently, that both judges and juries experience difficulty in rendering ac-
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curate decisions.
202
  Research suggests that, particularly in scientifically 
complex cases, the cognitive load imposed on factfinders by the nature of 
the evidence may compromise their comprehension of that evidence.
203
  Re-
searchers who have examined jury deliberations have shown that factfinders 
also sometimes have difficulty distinguishing relevant evidence from irrele-
vant evidence and from evidence that may be relevant but should not be 
considered (for example, whether one of the parties has insurance in a slip-
and-fall case).
204
  And vast amounts of research suggest that people are not 
any better than chance at determining whether someone is telling the truth 
or lying, which suggests that jurors may have difficulty determining credi-
ble evidence from evidence that is not credible.
205
 
The difficulty extends when applying the law as well.  With respect to 
admissibility decisions, judges have difficulty applying half of the Daubert 
criteria,
206
 and other research reveals that, largely because of the arcane lan-
guage contained in them, instructions to the jury about the law are often 
misunderstood.
207
  Compounding the problem, jurors sometimes apply facts 
to the laws as they understand them colloquially—that is, to their “common 
sense” understanding of what constitutes robbery or burglary—and not to 
the laws as they are defined by state and federal statutes.
208
  Thus, not only 
is decisional accuracy theoretically difficult to achieve, empirical research 
suggests that it is actually difficult to achieve as well. 
This research raises the question of how and why decisions from well-
intentioned people—and sometimes groups of well-intentioned people—
can become so flawed.  In studying human judgment and decisionmaking, 
behavioral researchers have identified several psychological determinants 
of decisional accuracy, which can aid policymakers in designing legal sys-
                                                          
 202.  See Joel Cooper, Elizabeth A. Bennett & Holly L. Sukel, Complex Scientific Testimony: 
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Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 452 (2001) (con-
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 207.  Diamond et al., supra note 204, at 1557–64. 
 208.  See Vicki L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the 
Law, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 507, 508–09 (1993) (concluding that jurors’ naïve preconceptions of 
the law influence their verdict decisions). 
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tems that maximize this important goal.
209
  Social psychologists have hy-
pothesized that processing information intended to persuade a listener con-
sists of two independent systems: (1) system 1, which is sometimes referred 
to as the “peripheral route” to persuasion; and (2) system 2, which is re-
ferred to as the “central route” to persuasion.210  Very different inputs con-
trol whether individuals engage in system 1 or system 2 processing, and 
each system provides very different behavioral and cognitive outputs.
211
 
Psychologists posit that the human brain, like a high-tech computer, 
has limited capacity and attempts to streamline the flow of cognitive re-
sources when possible.
212
  Thus, system 1 processing requires few cognitive 
resources and consists of reasoning that embodies the use of quick, superfi-
cial, and undemanding mental shortcuts.
213
  For example, when evaluating 
an advertising message, engaging in system 1 processing might lead an in-
dividual to put undue weight on the attractiveness of the speaker, based on 
an association between attractive people and positive attributes such as 
truthfulness.
214
  Although these mental shortcuts assist us in avoiding cogni-
tive overload, scores of research demonstrate that heuristic-based infor-
mation processing can, under certain circumstances, lead to errors in judg-
ment.
215
 
In contrast, system 2 processing is effortful, thoughtful, and slower 
than system 1 processing, and allows individuals to engage in abstract and 
higher-order thinking.
216
  There is a trade-off, however; system 2 processing 
is also cognitively taxing and requires considerably more effort to sus-
tain.
217
  Unlike with system 1 processing, features of the persuasive mes-
sage, and not superficial features of the speaker, affect the decisions of the 
individual engaged in system 2 processing.
218
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Because of the complex nature of trials involving scientific evidence, 
researchers agree that encouraging factfinders to engage in system 2 pro-
cessing is necessary.
219
  Behavioral researchers have identified two factors 
that determine whether an individual will engage in system 2 processing: 
the cognitive capacity of the individual and her motivation to engage in 
complex reasoning.
220
 
Several factors influence the extent to which an individual is motivated 
to engage in system 2 processing.  First, the individual’s “need for cogni-
tion”—that is, her desire to enjoy complex thinking—must be height-
ened.
221
  Second, the message must be made relevant to the individual, and 
the individual must feel a personal sense of responsibility for her judg-
ment.
222
 
Although an individual’s cognitive capacity for a given task is corre-
lated with intelligence and experience (and is therefore difficult to vary),
223
 
there are ways in which cognitive capacity can be increased.
224
  Researchers 
have shown that this can be done by increasing the amount of time neces-
sary to evaluate the message, by minimizing distractions, and by avoiding 
extreme affective states.
225
 
Of particular interest to policymakers, researchers have demonstrated 
that people prefer decisionmakers who make accurate decisions.
226
  For ex-
ample, in the management context, researchers found that the overall organ-
izational justice produced by a hospital—which includes as a component its 
ability to produce accurate decisions—was correlated with measures of em-
ployee satisfaction.
227
  So in sum, to the extent that policymakers can design 
a decisionmaking system that emphasizes the components of decisional ac-
curacy, they will not only maximize perceptions of accuracy but also partic-
ipants’ preferences for that system. 
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C.  Procedural Legitimacy 
The other discrete dimension by which litigants gauge the acceptabil-
ity of a decisionmaking paradigm is the degree to which it is perceived as 
procedurally legitimate.  According to law and economics scholars, people 
seek to maximize their self-interest and pursue opportunities that bring 
about the greatest possible material advantage.
228
  If this always were true, 
we would expect that people prefer legal systems that provide them with the 
best economic outcomes.
229
  Although research suggests that outcomes do 
matter with respect to people’s procedural preferences,230 the full story is 
more complex.  In conferring legitimacy onto a legal decision, people are 
remarkably sensitive to whether the process for reaching that decision was 
fair.
231
  This phenomenon, known as procedural justice, predicts “people’s 
reactions to their experiences with legal authorities are strongly shaped by 
their subjective evaluations of the justice of the procedures used to resolve 
their case.”232  In short, independent of outcomes, the manner in which a le-
gal dispute is decided can predict people’s preferences for certain legal pro-
cedures, perceptions of the decisionmaker’s legitimacy, and their willing-
ness to abide by its decisions. 
Researchers have identified several procedural factors that influence 
people’s perceptions of the legitimacy of a decisionmaking body:233 the de-
cisionmaker’s neutrality (that is, that the decision is based on rules and facts 
instead of the decisionmaker’s intuition),234 the degree of respect and digni-
ty that the decisionmaker confers on the parties,
235
 the amount of voice and 
control that the parties have over the legal dispute,
236
 and the degree to 
which parties can trust the decisionmaker’s motive to be fair.237  These fac-
                                                          
 228.  See generally LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE 
GOOD PEOPLE 27–30 (2011) (describing the adoption of the notion that individuals seek to max-
imize self interest in legal disciplines); see also JOHN W. THIBAUT & HAROLD H. KELLEY, THE 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUPS (1959). 
 229.  See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (2001). 
 230.  See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 231.  See generally Tom Tyler & David Markell, The Public Regulation of Land-Use Deci-
sions: Criteria for Evaluating Alternative Procedures, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD., 538, 569–70 
(2010) (suggesting “people are more willing to accept decisions made through procedures they 
judge to be fair”). 
 232.  Id. at 541.  
 233.  Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117, 121 
(2000). 
 234.  Id. at 122. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. at 121–22. 
 237.  Id. at 122. 
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tors manifest themselves in the laboratory and outside the laboratory
238
 and 
in both criminal and civil disputes.
239
 
Procedural justice is a robust phenomenon and its implications are far-
reaching.  In legal adjudication, perceptions of fair process can confer legit-
imacy on legal actors including judges
240
 and juries.
241
  It can also affect 
perceptions of legitimacy in alternative dispute resolution—including medi-
ation and arbitration—and also the legitimacy of the decisionmakers in 
those paradigms.
242
 
Not only do perceptions of fair treatment influence people’s prefer-
ences in the courtroom, they influence people’s preferences in the legal sys-
tem outside the courtroom and in non-legal contexts.
243
  For example, af-
fording those who have been stopped by the police an explanation for their 
detainment and a chance to explain themselves to a law enforcement officer 
increases people’s perceptions of law enforcement’s legitimacy.244  Moreo-
ver, perceptions of procedural fairness can increase perceptions of legitima-
cy (and a willingness to abide by decisions) in non-legal relationships that 
involve power dynamics, including superior-subordinate relationships in the 
workplace
245
 and in the family.
246
 
Two competing theories seek to explain why perceptions of fair pro-
cess influence a decisionmaker’s perceived legitimacy.  The first theory, 
proposed by John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, is instrumentalist in na-
ture.
247
  According to Thibaut and Walker, people desire control over deci-
                                                          
 238.  Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal 
Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 132–34 (2011). 
 239.  See E. ALLAN LIND, ARBITRATING HIGH-STAKES CASES: AN EVALUATION OF COURT-
ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN A UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 61–64 (1990) (describing the 
characteristics of arbitration programs in North Carolina). 
 240.  See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, 
AND COMPLIANCE 4 (2006) (noting that voluntary compliance is far preferred by legal authorities 
such as judges and police officers). 
 241.  Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens’ Perceptions of the Criminal 
Jury: Procedural Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 350 (1988). 
 242.  See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: 
Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 473, 
492 (2008) (finding that enhanced procedural justice encourages the acceptance of all types of 
negotiated agreements). 
 243.  Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 238, at 133. 
 244.  Tom R. Tyler & Robert Folger, Distributional and Procedural Aspects of Satisfaction 
with Citizen-Police Encounters, 1 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 281, 288–92 (1980). 
 245.  Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work Set-
tings: The Value of Self-Regulatory Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287, 1306 (2005) (finding 
that perceptions of procedural fairness in the workplace instill a sense of authoritative legitimacy, 
encouraging workers to follow company rules). 
 246.  Shelly Jackson & Mark Fondacaro, Procedural Justice in Resolving Family Conflict: Im-
plications for Youth Violence Prevention, 21 L. & POL’Y 101, 106 (1999). 
 247.  See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 173, at 117–24 (describing the theory). 
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sionmaking processes because process control leads to decision control.
248
  
As Tom Tyler explains the theory, people who give decision control to a 
third party will still attempt to maintain as much control over the decision 
as possible.
249
  Thus, parties’ focus on the fairness of process—for example, 
the ability to control the flow of evidence received by the decisionmaker—
is actually an attenuated focus on outcome control.
250
  Consequently, people 
will view fair process as instrumental to receiving desirable outcomes.
251
 
A competing view asserts that control over the process affords litigants 
dignitary benefits independent of favorable outcomes.
252
  This “value-
expressive” (or “group value”) model of procedural justice asserts that, by 
allowing litigants an opportunity to present their side of the dispute to the 
decisionmaker,
253
 by affording them respect as they do so,
254
 and by doing 
so in an unbiased manner,
255
 litigants will feel valued and respected by the 
decisionmaker as members of society.
256
  Research has demonstrated that 
people still value the ability to explain their case to a decisionmaker even 
when their ability to do so explicitly will have no effect on the outcome
257
 
which supports the group value model of procedural justice.
258
 
IV.  REDESIGNING THE SCIENCE COURT 
Proposals for redesigning the science court are long on theory but 
short on empirical support.  An empirically-based science court is more 
likely to receive greater public support, which in turn may affect its lon-
                                                          
 248.  Id.  
 249.  Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value Model, 
57 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 830, 830–31 (1987). 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  Id. 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  See Robert Folger, Distributive and Procedural Justice: Combined Impact of “Voice” 
and Improvement on Experienced Inequity, 35 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 108, 108–19 (1977) 
(discussing the importance of voice in ensuring justice). 
 254.  Tyler & Markell, supra note 231, at 547–48. 
 255.  See Folger, supra note 253, at 109 (explaining that “[h]aving a voice in the system . . . is 
often suggested as a critical mediator of satisfaction” in particular settings).  
 256.  See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allen Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25 ADV. 
EXP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 153–55 (1992) (noting that respect is frequently considered to be an 
indicator of fairness). 
 257.  Tom R. Tyler et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders: Exploring the 
Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 79 (1985); see also E. Allan Lind, 
Robin I. Lissak & Donald E. Conlon, Decision Control and Process Control Effects on Procedur-
al Fairness Judgments, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 338, 346–48 (1983) (finding that subjects of 
an experiment perceived procedures in which they had high control more fair than those in which 
they had less control). 
 258.  For a nonempirical perspective on procedural legitimacy, see generally Lawrence B. So-
lum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004). 
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gevity as a serious proposal to improve the manner in which scientific dis-
putes are adjudicated. 
This Part provides empirical support for the model introduced in 
Part III.  This Part will demonstrate that decisional accuracy and procedural 
legitimacy are differentially perceived within decisionmaking systems and 
across decisionmaking systems. 
A.  The Experiments 
Until now, the debate surrounding the redesign of the science court—
and the debate over how to facilitate the accurate apprehension of scientific 
evidence in traditional trial by jury—has focused on empirically untested 
theories of human cognition and human behavior.
259
  Few legal scholars 
have attempted to apply Thibaut and Walker’s research on procedural jus-
tice to this debate, and even fewer have constructed their own experiments 
to collect data that might inform how these decisionmaking paradigms 
should be established.  This Article is the first to do so in a series of four 
experiments. 
The first experiment seeks to demonstrate what past psychological re-
search has merely suggested: that different methods of resolving legal dis-
putes involve differing perceptions of those methods’ accuracy and fair-
ness.
260
  This, in turn, lends support to the idea that we should think about 
the design of these decisionmaking paradigms in terms of two orthogonal 
dimensions: decisional accuracy and procedural legitimacy.  The first ex-
periment also tests whether the disparity between perceptions of accuracy 
and legitimacy persists regardless of whether the dispute is civil or criminal 
in nature. 
The second experiment builds on the first by examining whether dif-
ferent systems of deciding legal disputes are perceived as differentially ac-
curate and differentially legitimate.
261
  If different procedural paradigms are 
perceived as differentially accurate and differentially fair, this suggests that 
the decision to enact different decisionmaking paradigms is actually a poli-
cy choice between competing—and not entirely complementary—
psychological values. 
The third and fourth experiments, which are presented in Part V be-
low, examine whether a hybrid decisionmaking paradigm—that is, one that 
incorporates elements of both the traditional trial by jury and the inquisito-
rial science court of old—is preferred by litigants and, if so, whether that 
                                                          
 259.  See supra Part III. 
 260.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 261.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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preference is a function of their perceptions of the hybrid system’s accuracy 
and legitimacy.
262
  I now turn to these experiments. 
B.  Study 1 
The first study examines how litigants perceive the accuracy and pro-
cedural legitimacy of two decisionmaking systems: the American adversari-
al system and the inquisitorial system favored by many foreign nations.  
Section 1 examines these perceptions in the context of a civil dispute, 
whereas Section 2 examines these perceptions in a criminal dispute.  The 
methods and results are reported below. 
1.  Civil Actions 
One hundred and forty-two participants were recruited via the Internet 
marketplace website “Amazon Mechanical Turk” (“AMT”).263  Each partic-
ipant completed an online survey in return for nominal payment.  Partici-
pants were restricted to those over eighteen years of age and who currently 
reside in the United States.  The sample was 58.9% female and averaged 
37.61 years of age.  Participants ranged in age from nineteen to sixty-six, 
and all participants were American citizens.  All participants completed the 
survey within ten to fifteen minutes. 
In the study, all participants were asked to imagine themselves as a 
member of the public (and thus a potential litigant), who was evaluating dif-
ferent types of legal procedures.  Participants read about a legal dispute in 
which a plaintiff consumed the defendant corporation’s blood pressure drug 
and became violently ill with severe stomach bleeding.  The plaintiff then 
sued the defendant to recover for her healthcare costs, lost earnings, and 
pain and suffering. 
The legal dispute always involved the testimony of an expert scientific 
witness who attempted to link the plaintiff’s injury to the defendant’s drug.  
The disputes differed, however, with respect to the legal procedure that the 
court used to resolve the case.  Half of the participants were exposed to an 
adversarial framework, in which both parties had the opportunity to present 
(and control) the evidence that the court received.  Specifically, these par-
ticipants were told—consistent with the current practice in civil disputes in 
state and federal court
264—that each party could select on its own, and pay 
for, an expert witness to explain its side of the case.  The participants were 
                                                          
 262.  See infra Part V. 
 263.  AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/mturk/ (last visited Feb. 25, 
2014). 
 264.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2) (describing the disclosure requirements for expert wit-
nesses in federal civil disputes). 
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also told that each party may interview as many expert witnesses as they 
desire and—consistent with civil practice265—that they need not inform the 
adversary party (or the court) of the persons they interviewed but ultimately 
chose not to hire as an expert witness.  Participants were also informed that 
each party had the right to cross-examine the adversary party’s expert. 
The remaining participants were exposed to an inquisitorial frame-
work, which is the norm in many foreign countries and was the model for 
one of the earlier-proposed science courts.
266
  Under this framework, partic-
ipants were told that the court would appoint an expert—with no input from 
either of the parties—to testify to the scientific issues involved in the case.  
These participants were also told that neither party would pay for the expert 
and that the expert would work independently of both parties.  In addition, 
participants were told that neither party could cross-examine the court-
appointed witness. 
To ensure participants were paying attention to the study, and to en-
sure that the experimental manipulation was successful, participants an-
swered a series of multiple-choice questions about the case and the legal 
rules by which the case would be decided.  Participants could not advance 
in the experiment until they answered all questions correctly.
267
  All partici-
pants completed the study and answered these attention, memory, and ma-
nipulation checks correctly. 
All participants then answered several questions designed to quantify 
their impressions of two psychological dimensions: the decisionmaker’s ac-
curacy and the decisionmaker’s legitimacy.  Specifically, participants an-
swered, on 7-point scales (ranging from, unless otherwise specified, “very 
little” to “very much”), the following questions:268 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 265.  Id. 
 266.  See supra Part III. 
 267.  If participants answered the questions incorrectly, they received an error message 
prompting them to reread the vignette and to answer the questions again. 
 268.  A 7-point Likert scale is a psychometric scale commonly used in questionnaires to cap-
ture data from ordinal or continuous variables.  See ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. 
ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN, EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 172 (2010).  Likert scales are 
used frequently to collect empirical data, although scholars have noted the limitations of this 
method.  See, e.g., Gerald Albaum, The Likert Scale Revisited: An Alternate Version, 39 J. MKT. 
RES. SOC’Y 331, 341 (1997) (explaining that “Likert scales as generally used tend to underesti-
mate the extreme positions held by people, and that a central tendency forms-related error ex-
ists”). 
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Accuracy Items 
“Accuracy” How likely is it that a decision reached using this 
procedure will be accurate? 
“True” How likely is it under this procedure that a court 
will uncover the true facts? 
“Right Information” How likely is it that this procedure will reveal the 
right information that the court needs to make a de-
cision? 
“Factual Decision” How much confidence would you have in the court 
to make a good factual decision? 
“Correct” How much faith do you have in a court using this 
procedure to resolve disputes correctly? 
 
Legitimacy Items 
“Gives Control” How much control does this procedure give people 
over the outcome? 
“Presents Arguments” How much does this procedure afford people an ad-
equate opportunity to present arguments to the deci-
sionmaker? 
“Gives Voice” How much does this procedure give people an ade-
quate opportunity to make their points? 
“Protects Rights” How much does this procedure adequately protects 
peoples’ rights when they bring forth a legal dis-
pute? 
“Provides Dignity” To what extent does this procedure treat people with 
dignity and respect? 
“Takes Disputes Seriously” To what extent does this procedure allow the court 
to take seriously peoples’ legal disputes? 
 
 
 
 
Participants then answered several demographic questions, listing their 
gender, age, income, highest level of education completed, race, political 
orientation, national origin, and the degree to which they took the study se-
riously.  Participants were also asked several questions designed to measure 
their prior experience with the law, including how often they had been to 
court, whether they had ever been involved in a civil or criminal proceeding 
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(as either a juror, a witness, or a litigant), and whether they had a job in 
which they interact with legal actors.  They were also asked for their gen-
eral impressions of (and feelings toward) the law.  Participants were then 
debriefed about the aims of the study and were dismissed. 
a.  Results and Discussion 
The results and discussion of this study proceed in two parts.
269
  First, I 
discuss the results of preliminary analyses, which examined (1) whether the 
questions posed to participants correctly measure two distinct psychological 
dimensions: accuracy and legitimacy; and (2) whether the participants’ de-
mographics affected the results.  Second, I discuss the main results, which 
examine whether adversarial and inquisitorial decisionmaking systems are 
perceived as being equally accurate and fair, or whether accuracy and fair-
ness are perceived differently. 
i.  Preliminary Analysis 
To measure whether the questions participants were asked represent 
two separate psychological constructs (which I label “accuracy” and legiti-
macy”), I employed a technique called a “factor analysis.”270  The factor 
analysis revealed that responses to the questions fell on two separate dimen-
sions, which together explained the vast majority of the variability in partic-
ipants’ responses.271  On the first dimension, labeled “Accuracy,” I placed 
the questions labeled “Correct,” “Accurate,” “True,” “Right Information,” 
                                                          
 269.  In each of these experiments, data was analyzed using (1) either a one-way or a two-way 
analysis of variance (“ANOVA”), which provides a statistical test of whether the means of several 
groups are equal, and (2) Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) Test, which examines 
which of those means differs from the other.  The ANOVA results are represented by an F-
statistic, and the sizes of the effects are represented by 2p.  Means are denoted by the letter “M” 
and standard deviations are denoted by the letters “SD.”  See generally LAWLESS ET AL., supra 
note 268, at 55–335 (explaining empirical research methodologies and statistical techniques).  Dif-
ferences are denoted as “statistically significant” in this Article if the statistical tests indicate that 
the likelihood that the difference observed would occur by chance is 5% or less (as indicated by 
the p-value as p < 0.05).  A difference is “marginally significant” if the likelihood of seeing such a 
difference by chance is greater than 5% but less than 10%.  See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies 
and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 485 n.117 (2003) (cit-
ing BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS (2d ed. 
1989)). Planned comparisons were accompanied by the Tukey HSD Test to stabilize the “fami-
lywise error rate” and avoid false positives.  See, e.g., James Jaccard, Michael A. Becker & Greg-
ory Wood, Pairwise Multiple Comparison Procedures: A Review, 96 PSYCHOL. BULL. 589 (1984) 
(discussing several techniques, including the Tukey technique, for controlling Type I error when 
making multiple comparisons among groups). 
 270.  See How to Reduce Number of Variables and Detect Relationships, Principal Compo-
nents and Factor Analysis, STATSOFT, www.statsoft.com/Textbook/Principal-Components-
Factor-Analysis (last visited Feb. 25, 2014) (explaining factor analytic techniques). 
 271.  These factors explained 82.47% of the variance in participants’ responses. 
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and “Factual Decision.”  The questions labeled “Protects Rights,” “Takes 
Disputes Seriously,” “Gives Voice,” “Presents Arguments,” “Gives Con-
trol,” and “Provides Dignity” loaded onto the other dimension, which I la-
beled “Legitimacy.”  Participants’ responses to all of the “Accuracy” items 
were highly correlated, and so—consistent with standard empirical practic-
es—I averaged them into one “Accuracy” measure.272  Similarly, partici-
pants’ responses to all of the “Legitimacy” items were highly correlated, 
thus I averaged them into one measure of “Legitimacy.”273 
Measurements of participants’ perceptions of accuracy and legitimacy 
were then examined with several demographic variables included in the 
model as predictors.  As expected, none of these demographic variables—or 
their interaction with other predictor variables—was a statistically signifi-
cant predictor of participants’ perceptions of accuracy and legitimacy.274  
As such, I report the main results without reference to demographic factors. 
ii.  Main Analysis 
I predicted that potential litigants perceive decisional accuracy and 
procedural legitimacy differently, yet it would be surprising to find that 
these two concepts were unrelated.  To test this hypothesis, I examined the 
bivariate correlation between the legitimacy measure and the accuracy 
measure across all participants.
275
  As expected, the two concepts are mod-
erately correlated.
276
  Finding a moderate correlation, of course, is different 
from concluding that litigants perceive these concepts to be equivalent.  I 
now turn to that question. 
To test the hypothesis that, with respect to civil disputes, litigants 
would perceive the adversarial procedure as more legitimate than it is accu-
rate (and vice versa for litigants exposed to an inquisitorial procedure), I 
conducted a 2 (ratings: accuracy vs. legitimacy) x 2 (procedure: adversarial 
vs. inquisitorial) analysis of variance (“ANOVA”)277 on the ratings given by 
                                                          
 272.  The correlation between multiple items is calculated through a “Cronbach’s alpha” statis-
tic.  Cronbach’s alpha values close to 1.0 are considered strongly correlated.  The Cronbach’s al-
pha value for the six accuracy items is .96. 
 273.  Cronbach’s alpha is .84. 
 274.  All F-values < 1.00; all p-values > .05. 
 275.  A bivariate correlation represents the degree to which two items relate to each other.  The 
correlation is represented by the “Pearson’s r” statistic and ranges from -1 to +1.  Correlations 
close to +1 and to -1 are stronger whereas correlations close to 0 are weaker.  Positive correlations 
indicate that an increase in one item is accompanied by an increase in the second item (for exam-
ple, weight and height).  Negative correlations indicate that an increase in one item is accompa-
nied by a decrease in the second item. 
 276.  Pearson’s r(140) = .52, p < .001. 
 277.  A 2x2 design means that one experimental variable—here, participants’ perceptions—
contains two different versions (accuracy and legitimacy), while the other—the procedure to 
which participants were exposed—also contains two different versions (adversarial and inquisito-
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the potential litigants.  The results, displayed in the figure below, revealed 
that participants’ ratings of accuracy and fairness were statistically different 
from each other, and that the nature of the difference depended on the deci-
sionmaking procedure that the litigants experienced.
278
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As seen in the left-handed side of the figure above, when participants 
were exposed to an adversarial procedure, they rated the procedure as sig-
nificantly less accurate than it was legitimate.
279
  This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that when litigants are afforded a high degree of control over the 
evidence in the adversarial system, they perceive that system as providing 
dignity and voice, which are components of procedural legitimacy.  This 
control over the evidence appears to be a double-edged sword.  Litigants do 
not perceive the adversarial system to be as accurate as it is fair, perhaps 
because the adversarial system allows for the biased assimilation of evi-
dence from biased attorneys to the neutral factfinder. 
                                                          
rial). This design was both “between subjects”—which means that different participants were ex-
posed to just one procedure—and “within subjects”—which means that multiple data from the 
same subjects were collected (here, their ratings of accuracy and fairness).  An ANOVA provides 
a statistical test of whether the means of several groups are equal.  See LAWLESS ET AL., supra 
note 268. 
 278.  There was a statistically significant interaction between the procedure to which partici-
pants were exposed and their perceptions of accuracy and legitimacy.  F(1, 140) = 98.28, p < .001, 
n
2
p = .41. 
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2
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A very different picture emerges when litigants are exposed to an in-
quisitorial decisionmaking paradigm.  As seen in the right-hand side of the 
figure, these participants perceived the inquisitorial system as significantly 
less legitimate than it was accurate.
280
  Again, consistent with my hypothe-
sis, by vesting in the neutral factfinder the power to collect evidence—
including scientific expertise—the inquisitorial paradigm appears less sus-
ceptible to the perception that the decisionmaking tribunal is evaluating 
faulty, biased evidence.  But this perception comes at a cost; by losing their 
“voice”—their ability to communicate with the factfinder by presenting the 
evidence that the factfinder should consider—litigants perceive the process 
as significantly less fair. 
In sum, this study suggests that there are important tradeoffs that occur 
in litigants’ perceptions of accuracy and legitimacy as a function of the type 
of tribunal that decides the case.  Litigants perceive the adversarial system 
as favoring legitimacy while sacrificing accuracy, whereas they perceive the 
inquisitorial system as favoring accuracy at the cost of perceived legitima-
cy. 
We might wonder if this is true across both civil and criminal actions.  
Perhaps perceptions of accuracy and legitimacy are particularly heightened 
when liberty, rather than money, is at stake.  Even so, if the differences ob-
served in civil trials regarding accuracy and legitimacy are true differences, 
criminal trials should, if anything, exacerbate those differences.  Thus, I hy-
pothesize that these perceptions are robust, and that we should observe the 
same pattern of results in criminal settings.  The next study tests this hy-
pothesis. 
2.  Criminal Actions 
Fifty-five participants, who had not participated in the previous study, 
were recruited via the internet marketplace AMT to participate in an online 
study for nominal payment.  The sample was 41.80% female, 70.40% Cau-
casian, and averaged 32.24 years of age.  Participants ranged from nineteen 
to sixty years of age.  The study took participants between ten to fifteen 
minutes to complete. 
In this study, participants were asked to picture themselves as mem-
bers of the public (and thus potential litigants) evaluating legal procedures 
in a criminal trial.  The criminal trial was based on a Pennsylvania statute 
involving injuries from a dog bite.  Under Pennsylvania law, a person 
whose dog causes “severe injury” to another person is guilty of a misde-
                                                          
 280.  M-accuracy = 5.09 (SD = 1.49), M-legitimacy = 3.82 (SD = 1.30).  F(1, 68) = 82.21, p < 
.001, n
2
p = .55. 
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meanor punishable by up to five years in prison.
281
  Participants read about 
a case in which expert scientific testimony was elicited to determine wheth-
er “severe injury” had occurred to the victim who was bitten by the defend-
ant’s dog. 
As in the previous study, all participants read the same case, but they 
were exposed to different rules regarding how the case would be decided.  
Half of the participants learned that the dispute would be resolved through 
adversarial means, and that the parties would interview, select, and present 
their own expert witnesses at their own expense.  The other participants 
learned that the dispute would be resolved inquisitorially, such that the 
court would pay for and provide the expert testimony in the case. 
Then, all participants answered the same questions posed in the civil 
trial study, which were designed to quantify their perceptions of the accura-
cy and legitimacy of the legal proceedings.
282
  Participants then responded 
to demographic questions, were debriefed about the study’s aims, and were 
dismissed. 
a.  Results and Discussion 
The results are discussed in two parts.  First, I discuss the results of a 
preliminary analysis regarding the validity of the study measures and 
whether demographic factors affected the study results.  Second, I examine 
the relationship between litigants’ perceptions of accuracy, their perceptions 
of legitimacy, and the type of procedure in a criminal trial. 
i.  Preliminary Analysis 
As in Study 1, I employed factor analysis to determine whether the 
questions posed to participants measured decisional accuracy and procedur-
al legitimacy as distinct concepts.  The factor analysis revealed that partici-
pants’ answers to these questions fell onto two distinct dimensions, accura-
cy and legitimacy, which together explained most of the variability in their 
responses.
283
  The items that loaded onto the accuracy dimension were high-
ly correlated, so I averaged them together into one “accuracy” measure.284  
The items that loaded onto the legitimacy dimension were also highly corre-
lated, and thus were averaged into one “legitimacy” measure.285  As in 
Study 1, none of the demographic information provided by participants sys-
                                                          
 281.  3 PA. STAT. ANN. § 459-505-A(c) (West 2008).  See also Commonwealth v. Hake, 738 
A.2d 46, 47 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (considering whether to hold an owner of a dog criminally 
liable under the Pennsylvania statute when the dog attacked a human being unprovoked). 
 282.  See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 283.  These factors explained 84.00% of the variance in participants’ responses. 
 284.  Cronbach’s alpha value is .95. 
 285.  Cronbach’s alpha value is .79. 
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tematically predicted their perceptions of accuracy and legitimacy.
286
  As 
such, the remainder of the analysis does not discuss these demographic var-
iables. 
ii.  Main Analysis 
I again tested whether perceptions of accuracy and perceptions of le-
gitimacy were correlated.  As expected, the results revealed a moderate cor-
relation between these concepts.
287
  I next tested whether the adversarial 
system produces different perceptions of accuracy and legitimacy in crimi-
nal disputes, and whether the inquisitorial system does as well.  I now turn 
to that analysis. 
To test the hypothesis that, in criminal trials, litigants perceive the ad-
versarial system as more legitimate than it is accurate—and vice-versa in 
the inquisitorial system—I performed a 2 (ratings: accuracy vs. legitimacy) 
x 2 (procedure: adversarial vs. inquisitorial) ANOVA on the ratings given 
by potential litigants.  As in the first study, perceptions of accuracy and le-
gitimacy, illustrated in the figure below, differed significantly as a function 
of the type of system to which participants were exposed.
288
 
 
 
As seen in the left-hand side of the figure above, litigants exposed to 
an adversarial procedure perceived the procedure as significantly less accu-
rate than it was legitimate.
289
  The mirror image of these results is shown on 
the right-hand side of the figure, which graphs litigants’ perceptions of ac-
                                                          
 286.  All F-values < 1.00; all p-values > .05. 
 287.  Pearson’s r(53) = .46, p < .001. 
 288.  There was a statistically significant interaction between the ratings that participants gave 
and the procedure to which they were exposed.  F(1, 53) = 37.43, p < .001, n
2
p = .41. 
 289.  M-accuracy = 4.55 (SD = 1.57), M-legitimacy = 5.13 (SD = 0.92).  F(1, 26) = 8.77, p = 
.006, n
2
p = .25. 
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curacy and legitimacy with respect to the inquisitorial decisionmaking sys-
tem.  Here, litigants perceived the system as significantly less legitimate 
than it was accurate.
290
  Thus, as predicted, litigants’ perception of the accu-
racy and legitimacy of these systems was robust across civil and criminal 
proceedings.  Across different types of cases, it appears that adversarial and 
inquisitorial systems favor the perceptions of different values.
291
 
C.  Study 2 
The first study suggests that litigants’ perceptions of a lawmaking 
body’s decisional accuracy and procedural legitimacy can differ, and that 
the nature of those differences depends on the structural features of the de-
cisionmaking body.  Study 2 examines whether participants view different 
legal systems—here, the adversarial and inquisitorial paradigms—as differ-
entially accurate and differentially legitimate.  The methods and results are 
reported below.
292
 
1.  Methods and Procedure 
Two hundred and forty-one participants, who had not participated in 
the previous studies, were recruited via AMT for nominal payment.  As in 
the prior studies, the sample was diverse with respect to age, gender, race, 
and other demographic variables.
293
  Participants gave their informed con-
sent and read the study instructions. 
The procedure in this study was identical to the procedure in the civil 
trial version of Study 1.
294
  Participants read about a lawsuit in which the 
plaintiff sued the defendant corporation for damages related to a stomach 
illness, allegedly caused by the defendant’s blood pressure medication.  
Half of the participants were exposed to an adversarial paradigm for resolv-
ing the legal dispute—where each party controls the expert testimony that is 
presented to the court—while the others were exposed to an inquisitorial 
                                                          
 290.  M-accuracy = 5.42 (SD = 1.01), M-legitimacy = 4.35 (SD = 1.04).  F(1, 27) = 33.21, p < 
.001, n
2
p = .55. 
 291.  This is confirmed by additional statistical analysis.  An analysis of the civil and criminal 
data together in a three-way design—specifically, a 2 (case type: civil vs. criminal) x 2 (proce-
dure: adversarial vs. inquisitorial) x 2 (ratings: accuracy vs. fairness) design—revealed no signifi-
cant three-way interaction, which confirms that the additional variable—case type—had no effect 
on the results.  F(1, 193) = 0.24, p = .625, n
2
p = .00. 
 292.  The data from Study 1 could have been reanalyzed to determine if these paradigms are 
also perceived as differentially accurate and procedurally legitimate.  To permit the replication of 
the results found in Study 1, I ran Study 2 with a separate sample of participants. 
 293.  The sample was 54.40% female, averaged 37.15 years of age (with a range between 18 
and 70), and was 76.70% Caucasian. 
 294.  See supra Part IV.B.1. 
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paradigm for resolving the dispute, in which the court appointed an expert 
witness to testify to the scientific issues in the case. 
Again, participants answered a series of items designed to quantify 
their perceptions of the accuracy and legitimacy of each decisionmaking 
paradigm.  Factor analysis revealed that the eleven items (1) loaded onto 
distinct “accuracy” and “legitimacy” dimensions; (2) accounted for the vast 
majority of the variability in participants’ responses;295 and (3) were each 
averaged to form two distinct perceptual measures.
296
  Participants also an-
swered demographic questions, which later analyses confirmed did not af-
fect their perceptions of accuracy and legitimacy.
297
  Participants took ten to 
fifteen minutes to complete the survey, and were debriefed and dismissed. 
2.  Results and Discussion 
Perceptions of accuracy moderately correlated with perceptions of le-
gitimacy.
298
  To determine whether the adversarial system or the inquisitori-
al system is perceived as more accurate than the other—and whether the 
adversarial or the inquisitorial system is perceived as more legitimate then 
the other—I conducted a 2 (ratings: accuracy vs. legitimacy) x 2 (proce-
dure: adversarial vs. inquisitorial) ANOVA on participants’ perceptions of 
accuracy and legitimacy.  This figure illustrates that the adversarial system 
and the inquisitorial system were perceived differently with respect to both 
accuracy and legitimacy.
299
 
 
                                                          
 295.  These dimensions together accounted for 77.31% of the variability. 
 296.  Cronbach’s alpha value for the accuracy dimension is .96; Cronbach’s alpha value for the 
legitimacy dimension is .89. 
 297.  All F-values < 1.00; all p-values > .05. 
 298.  Pearson’s r(239) = .63, p < .001. 
 299.  There was a statistically significant interaction between the procedure to which partici-
pants were exposed and their ratings of accuracy and fairness.  F(1, 239) = 72.02, p < .001, n
2
p = 
.23. 
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Specifically, as illustrated in the figure above, the adversarial system 
was perceived as producing significantly less accurate verdicts compared to 
the inquisitorial system.
300
  This is consistent with the hypothesis that, be-
cause the inquisitorial system vests control of the evidence in neutral third 
parties, the evidence can be trusted more by the litigants and by the court.  
In contrast, the production of evidence by biased advocates in the adversari-
al paradigm apparently causes litigants to perceive that that the American 
adversarial paradigm leads to comparatively faultier decisions.  Moreover, 
the ability of lawyers to cross-examine the “biased” evidence produced by 
the adversary party does not ameliorate this perception. 
The data is different with respect to perceptions of legitimacy, as illus-
trated in the right-hand side of the figure.  Although it was perceived as less 
accurate than the inquisitorial system, the adversarial system was perceived 
as significantly more legitimate.
301
  If we consider legitimacy to be a func-
tion of the level of voice, respect, and opportunity to present evidence af-
forded to litigants,
302
 then this result is consistent with the existing empiri-
cal literature.  The inquisitorial system, in an effort to neutralize potential 
biases with respect to the quality of evidence presented, minimizes the con-
trol that the parties have over the evidence.  Thus, the takeaway from this 
experiment, discussed in more detail in Parts V and VI, is that the choice to 
design a decisionmaking paradigm in an adversarial vein or in an inquisito-
rial vein is actually a choice between the perception of two competing—and 
not altogether complementary—values. 
V.  A MODEST PROPOSAL: THE NEW SCIENCE COURT 
These studies give us important information for how to design a sci-
ence court that will enjoy the greatest degree of public acceptance.  The 
studies tell us that psychological concepts such as decisional accuracy and 
procedural legitimacy are not inexorably intertwined.
303
  And as we move 
along the continuum from an adversarial legal proceeding to an inquisitorial 
proceeding, litigants’ perceptions of decisional accuracy and procedural le-
gitimacy shift dramatically.
304
  Procedures that are more adversarial in na-
ture—that is, those that include trials by jury, cross-examination of witness-
es, and greater control over the flow of information to the factfinder—are 
                                                          
 300.  M-adversarial = 4.40 (SD = 1.41), M-inquisitorial = 5.14 (SD = 1.32).  F(1, 239) = 
33.05, p < .001, n
2
p = .07. 
 301.  M-adversarial = 4.70 (SD = 1.34), M-inquisitorial = 4.30 (SD = 1.38).  F(1, 239) = 5.27, 
p = .022, n
2
p = .02. 
 302.  See supra Part III.C. 
 303.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 304.  See supra Part IV.C. 
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considered more procedurally legitimate than they are accurate.
305
  Proce-
dures that are more inquisitorial in nature, however—that include features 
such as bench trials, court-appointed expert witnesses, and a reduced role 
for the attorney-advocate (and an increased role for the factfinder)—are 
considered more accurate than they are procedurally legitimate.
306
 
With these important factors in mind, I propose a redesigned science 
court to adjudicate complex scientific disputes.  If designing a science court 
entirely in the adversarial mode will lead to increased perceptions of proce-
dural legitimacy but decreased perceptions of decisional accuracy, and if 
designing the court in the inquisitorial mode will cause litigants to perceive 
the science court as producing more accurate decisions but by less proce-
durally valid means, then including facets of both of these decisionmaking 
paradigms may prioritize both of these important psychological concepts. 
To that end, the redesigned science court has the following compo-
nents.  First, the science court must be composed of science-savvy jurists 
(and law clerks) who are educated consumers of the scientific method.  
Second, the expert witnesses who testify at trial should be appointed by the 
court, and they should work independently of the parties to the litigation.  
Ideally, judges would choose these experts from a state or federal pool of 
scientists who are independently qualified to serve as expert witnesses in 
the science court.  Third, each party to the litigation must be allowed to 
vigorously cross-examine the court-appointed expert after she has given her 
report to the court.  Finally, the science court should include the jury as the 
factfinder. 
These recommendations should maximize the public’s perceptions of 
the science court’s decisional accuracy and procedural legitimacy, which in 
turn should increase its public support.  Procedural legitimacy should be 
enhanced by the adversarial features of the proposed science court: trials by 
jury and vigorous cross-examination.  By incorporating these facets of the 
adversarial system into the proposed court, litigants should perceive that 
their voice is being heard by the factfinder, which will increase their per-
ceptions of the dignity the factfinder affords them.  The decisional accuracy 
of the proposed court should be enhanced by requiring the court to appoint 
the expert witness and by requiring that the judge have sufficient familiarity 
with, and understanding of, the scientific method.  Requiring the court-
appointed expert to work independently of the parties should reduce public 
perception that expert witnesses are “hired guns” who are biased to shape 
their testimony to favor the party that has hired them.  Requiring judges to 
have a sufficient understanding of the scientific method should assuage the 
concerns of commentators that judges do not understand scientific evi-
                                                          
 305.  See supra Part IV.C. 
 306.  See supra Part IV.C. 
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dence, and may increase the likelihood that science court jurors have suffi-
cient guidance from the court when reaching their verdicts. 
The claims I raise here are not just theoretical; they are also empirical.  
Before implementing the proposed science court, it is possible to test 
whether it does, in fact, enjoy the greatest degree of public support, lead lit-
igants to perceive it as highly accurate, and lead litigants to perceive it as 
procedurally legitimate.  The remaining studies aim to provide that sup-
port.
307
 
A.  Study 3: Preference for the New Science Court 
I developed an empirical study in order to determine whether the sci-
ence court proposed in this Article is the preferred method for adjudicating 
matters involving sophisticated scientific evidence.  In this section, I will 
describe the design and results of the study. 
1.  Methods and Procedure 
A diverse sample of two hundred and eighty men and women partici-
pated in an online survey for nominal payment via AMT.  Participants gave 
their informed consent and were provided with instructions for the online 
study. 
As in the previous studies reported in this Article, participants read 
about a civil trial in which the plaintiff sued the defendant corporation over 
injuries stemming from the corporation’s blood pressure medication.  The 
plaintiff’s case always included an expert scientific witness, who testified to 
facts purporting to link the defendant’s medication to the plaintiff’s injuries.  
Participants were not told of the jury’s verdict. 
This time, however, the decisionmaking process was varied in accord-
ance with past proposals for the science court and with the research findings 
reported earlier in this Article.  Participants read one of four different pro-
cedures for resolving the civil dispute.  Some participants read about the 
decisionmaking procedure for which I advocate in this article: the court 
chooses an expert from a pool of qualified experts to testify to the scientific 
issues in the case, and the parties also have the right to vigorously cross ex-
amine the expert.  The perceptions of participants in this condition were 
compared to the perceptions of participants in three other experimental con-
ditions: (1) a “pure” adversarial paradigm, which is the current model for 
ordinary civil litigation in the United States; (2) a modified version of the 
adversarial model, in which the court establishes a pool of experts from 
which each party may select one to testify on their behalf (and may “shop 
around” within the pool until the parties find an acceptable expert); or (3) a 
                                                          
 307.  See infra Parts V.A–B. 
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“pure” inquisitorial paradigm, in which the court chooses the expert witness 
that testifies and whom the parties do not cross-examine.  A table that re-
flects each of these paradigms and their most important elements is pro-
duced below:
308
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adversarial Modified Adversarial Inquisitorial 
Parties choose their 
own expert witness. 
Parties choose their 
own expert witness 
from a pool of ex-
perts. 
Court appoints its own 
expert witness. 
Parties pay for the ex-
pert. 
Parties pay for the ex-
pert. 
Court pays for the ex-
pert. 
Expert works for the 
party that retains her. 
Expert works for the 
party that retains her. 
Expert works inde-
pendently of both par-
ties. 
Parties need not dis-
close the identity of 
experts with whom 
they consulted but do 
not hire. 
Parties need not dis-
close the identity of 
experts with whom 
they consulted but did 
not hire. 
Parties have no inter-
action with the expert 
witness outside of 
court. 
Cross-examination is 
allowed. 
Cross-examination is 
allowed. 
Cross-examination is 
not allowed. 
 
After reading the case and answering questions designed to test their 
comprehension, attention, and memory for the facts, participants rated how 
much they preferred each procedure (on a 7-point scale ranging from 
                                                          
 308.  The purpose of this experiment was to compare specific dispute resolution paradigms 
with respect to the perceptions of decisional accuracy and procedural legitimacy that they pro-
duce.  As such, different components of these paradigms—for example, the parties’ ability to 
cross-examine the expert and the extent to which the parties could choose their expert—did not 
always vary in tandem with each other. 
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“strongly do not prefer” to “strongly prefer”).  Participants then answered 
demographic questions, were debriefed as to the aims of the study, and 
were dismissed. 
2.  Results and Discussion 
To test whether participants preferred the proposed science court to the 
other models discussed above, I performed a one-way ANOVA on partici-
pants’ preference for the decisionmaking procedures.  The ANOVA re-
vealed that participants differed with respect to their preferences.
309
  Their 
preferences are illustrated below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most importantly, participants preferred the proposed science court to 
all other methods of resolving the legal dispute.  I also performed conserva-
tive post-hoc statistical tests to determine whether participants preferred the 
proposed science court significantly to each of its competitors.  These tests 
revealed that the proposed science court was highly preferred to the “pure” 
adversarial,
310
 the modified adversarial,
311
 and the “pure” inquisitorial312 
                                                          
 309.  F(3, 276) = 21.69, p < .001, n
2
p = .19. 
 310.  M-science-court = 6.05 (SD = 1.00), M-adversarial = 4.04 (SD = 1.74), p < .001. 
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methods of resolving the legal dispute.  This study provides evidence that 
the procedure for the science court proposed in this Article would enjoy the 
broadest support by litigants. 
But an important question remains unanswered: why do the potential 
litigants in this sample prefer the proposed science court?  Perhaps the pro-
posed science court enjoys support because it is perceived highly in terms 
of the decisional accuracy and procedural legitimacy that it provides.  This 
hypothesis is empirically testable.  The final study reported in this Article 
examines whether that hypothesis is true. 
B.  Study 4: Accuracy, Legitimacy, and the New Science Court 
In this section I report the results of a study conducted to examine 
whether the proposed science court, in addition to being the most preferred 
method for adjudicating complex scientific disputes, is also perceived as the 
most decisionally accurate and procedurally legitimate.  The design and re-
sults of that study are reported below, along with a statistical analysis de-
signed to demonstrate that litigants’ preferences for the proposed science 
court are a result of its heightened perceptions of decisional accuracy and 
procedural legitimacy.
313
 
1.  Decisional Accuracy 
To test the hypothesis that the proposed science court enjoys height-
ened perceptions of decisional accuracy, I performed a one-way ANOVA 
on participants’ perceptions of accuracy among all four procedural condi-
tions.  The results are illustrated below. 
  
                                                          
 311.  M-science-court = 6.05 (SD = 1.00), M-modified-adversarial = 4.31 (SD = 1.74), 
p < .001. 
 312.  M-science-court = 6.05 (SD = 1.00), M-inquisitorial = 5.02 (SD = 1.80), p < .001. 
 313.  The same participants from Study 4 also participated in Study 5.  In addition to reporting 
their preferences for different legal procedures (Study 4), they also reported their perceptions of 
decisional accuracy and procedural legitimacy.  Those results are reported separately here. 
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The one-way ANOVA revealed that mean perceptions of accuracy dif-
fered among the four groups.
314
  I then performed conservative post-hoc 
tests to determine which experimental group’s perceptions of decisional ac-
curacy were meaningfully different from the others.  The results revealed 
that the proposed science court was perceived as significantly more deci-
sionally accurate than the “pure” adversarial model of resolving legal dis-
putes
315
 and its modified cousin.
316
  The proposed science court, even under 
this conservative post-hoc statistical test, was perceived as more decisional-
ly accurate than the inquisitorial model as well, even though the inquisitori-
al model was perceived as accurate in other studies reported in this Arti-
cle.
317
  These findings provide evidence that the proposed science court’s 
perceived advantage with respect to decisional accuracy is at least one rea-
son why litigants prefer it to the other decisionmaking paradigms discussed 
in this Article.  But whether the proposed science court’s advantage extends 
to procedurally legitimacy is an open question.  I turn to that analysis be-
low. 
2.  Procedural Legitimacy 
I performed one final one-way ANOVA to determine whether the pro-
posed science court also holds an advantage compared to other methods of 
                                                          
 314.  F(3, 276) = 15.79, p < .001, n
2
p = .15. 
 315.  M-science-court = 5.64 (SD = 0.97), M-adversarial = 4.23 (SD = 1.49), p < .001. 
 316.  M-science-court = 5.64 (SD = 0.97), M-modified-adversarial = 4.32 (SD = 1.58), p < 
.001. 
 317.  M-science-court = 5.64 (SD = 0.97), M-inquisitorial = 5.09 (SD = 1.49), p = .022. 
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resolving scientific disputes with respect to its procedural legitimacy.  The 
results are illustrated below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ANOVA revealed that perceptions of legitimacy differed as a 
function of the procedure to which the litigants were exposed.
318
  Most im-
portantly, the science court proposed in this Article enjoyed the highest per-
ceptions of procedural legitimacy of each of the decisionmaking models 
tested.  Conservative post-hoc tests reveal that perceptions of legitimacy 
were closer to each other than were perceptions of decisional accuracy; 
nonetheless, the proposed science court was perceived as significantly more 
legitimate than the “pure” adversarial model,319 its modified cousin,320 and 
the inquisitorial model.
321
 
3.  Multiple Mediation Analysis 
These analyses suggest that potential litigants prefer the proposed sci-
ence court, and that the proposed science court enjoys greater perceived de-
cisional accuracy and greater perceived procedural legitimacy compared to 
the adversarial, modified adversarial, and inquisitorial decisionmaking par-
adigms.  But these analyses do not examine whether litigants prefer the new 
science court because of its perceived advantage with respect to accuracy 
and legitimacy.  A statistical technique called “mediation” can be used to 
make that determination. 
                                                          
 318.  F(3, 276) = 17.09, p < .001, n
2
p = 16. 
 319.  M-science-court = 5.24 (SD = 0.96), M-adversarial = 4.78 (SD = 1.13), p = .024.   
 320.  M-science-court = 5.24 (SD = 0.96), M-modified-adversarial = 4.75 (SD = 1.34), 
p = .017. 
 321.  M-science-court = 5.24 (SD = 0.96), M-inquisitorial = 3.82 (SD = 1.30), p < .001. 
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Mediation, which is sometimes called a “path analysis,” consists of a 
series of regressions designed to create a “path” between the predictor vari-
able (in this case, the decisionmaking procedure to which litigants were ex-
posed) and the outcome variable (here, litigants’ preferences for that proce-
dure).
322
  Specifically, a path analysis can tell us whether the path from the 
procedure to which litigants were exposed to participants’ preferences for 
the procedure is mediated by the procedure’s perceived decisional accuracy 
and procedural legitimacy.
323
 
We can think of a multiple mediation analysis as a series of predictive 
“connect-the-dots” statistical statements.324  A successful mediation analy-
sis would first demonstrate that the predictor variable predicts the outcome 
variable.
325
  It would then show that the predictor variable also predicts both 
of the mediators, and that the mediators, in turn, predict the outcome varia-
ble.
326
  Finally, the mediation would show that the initial effect of the pre-
dictor variable on the outcome variable is reduced (or even eliminated) 
when the mediators are added to the statistical model, which suggests that 
the mediators are responsible for the predictor variable affecting the out-
come variable.
327
 
With this understanding of a multiple mediation analysis in mind, I ex-
amined the relationship between the procedure to which litigants were ex-
posed, their preferences for that procedure, their perceptions of the proce-
dure’s accuracy, and their perceptions of the procedure’s legitimacy.  First, 
I confirmed the results of Study 4 by examining via a regression analysis 
whether the procedure to which participants were exposed affected their 
preferences for the procedure.  The regression analysis confirmed that a 
strong relationship exists between the two.
328
 
                                                          
 322.  Kristopher J. Preacher & Andrew F. Hayes, Asymptotic and Resampling Strategies for 
Assessing and Comparing Indirect Effects in Multiple Mediator Models, 40 BEHAV. RES. 
METHODS 879, 879 (2008) (explaining that “[m]ediation hypotheses posit how . . . an independent 
variable (X) affects a dependent variable (Y) through one or more potential intervening varia-
bles”). 
 323.  Mediation analysis detects “when a predictor affects a dependent variable indirectly 
through at least one intervening variable, or mediator.”  Id.  The mediation analysis reported in 
this Article is performed using a linear regression analysis and reports unstandardized coefficients, 
“B,” and standard errors, “SE.”  It also reports a “t” statistic, which determines whether the coeffi-
cients are statistically significant. 
 324.  Id. at 879 (depicting a simple mediation model and explaining that “[predictor] variable 
X’s causal effect can be apportioned into its indirect effect on Y through [mediator] M and its di-
rect effect on Y”). 
 325.  Id. 
 326.  Id. 
 327.  Id. at 880 (explaining that the total effect of predictor variable X on Y can be expressed 
as a sum of direct and indirect effects). 
 328.  B = .47, SE = 0.09, t = 5.20, p < .001. 
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I next evaluated whether the procedure to which participants were ex-
posed affected their perceptions of its accuracy and its legitimacy.  A re-
gression analysis confirmed that the procedure to which participants were 
exposed systematically predicted their perceptions of decisional accura-
cy.
329
  Moreover, the same was true of their perceptions of procedural legit-
imacy.
330
 
The third step in the mediation analysis establishes whether these per-
ceptions of accuracy and legitimacy predict litigants’ overall preferences for 
the procedures to which they were exposed.  A regression of litigants’ per-
ceptions of the procedure’s accuracy on their preferences for the procedure 
showed a significant relationship between the two variables.
331
  Moreover, 
the same was true with respect to their perceptions of the procedure’s legit-
imacy and their preferences for the procedure.
332
  Thus, so far, the media-
tion analysis suggests that a statistically significant path exists between the 
predictor variable and the outcome variable: the procedure to which partici-
pants were exposed affected their perceptions of the procedure’s decisional 
accuracy and its procedural legitimacy; moreover, these perceptions of ac-
curacy and legitimacy significantly predicted their preferences for the pro-
cedure. 
The final step is to demonstrate that the strength of the direct relation-
ship between the procedure to which litigants were exposed and their pref-
erences for it (absent the two mediators: accuracy and fairness) is signifi-
cantly weakened when the mediators are included in the statistical model 
(on the theory that perceptions of accuracy and fairness reduce the effect 
from the original predictor variable).  The effect of the procedure to which 
participants were exposed on their preferences for it is, on its own, strong 
and significant.
333
  But that effect is significantly reduced when perceptions 
of decisional accuracy and procedural legitimacy are included in the mod-
el.
334
  This suggests that accuracy and legitimacy mediate litigants’ prefer-
ences for certain decisionmaking procedures.  The relationship, which in-
cludes the regression coefficients, is illustrated in the figure below. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 329.  B = .39, SE = 0.08, t = 5.04, p < .001. 
 330.  B = -.24, SE = 0.07, t = -3.51, p < .001. 
 331.  B = .76, SE = 0.06, t = 13.63, p < .001. 
 332.  B = .32, SE = 0.06, t = 5.00, p < .001. 
 333.  B = .47, SE = 0.09, t = 5.20, p < .001 
 334.  B = .25, SE = 0.06, t = 4.19, p < .001. 
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Finally, we can determine statistically the proportion of participants’ 
preferences for the new science court that is attributable to the procedure’s 
perceived decisional accuracy and procedural legitimacy.  The analysis re-
vealed that the procedure’s accuracy and legitimacy account for nearly half 
of participants’ preferences for it.335  No other variables examined in these 
data account for that amount of litigants’ total decisionmaking variability.  
This provides support for using accuracy and legitimacy as the two primary 
dimensions by which we gauge participants’ preferences for decisionmak-
ing procedures.  The implications of this finding are discussed below. 
                                                          
 335.  The effect of the legal procedure to which participants were exposed on participants’ 
preferences for that procedure, without including accuracy and legitimacy as mediators, is .47.  
When the mediators are included in the model, the effect of procedure is reduced to .25, which is a 
47% reduction.  Thus, the decisional accuracy and procedural legitimacy afforded by a legal pro-
cedure account for 47% of the variability in participants’ preferences for that procedure. 
Decisional Accuracy 
Legal 
Procedure 
Procedural 
Preference 
Procedural Legitimacy 
.47** 
   
(.25**) 
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VI.  IMPLICATIONS, OBJECTIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
Empirically-based approaches to institutional design can be enormous-
ly helpful to legal policymakers.
336
  In designing a decisionmaking para-
digm, policymakers can use real data to understand what litigants actually 
perceive about the paradigm and whether they actually prefer it to its alter-
natives.
337
  Increased public support for the paradigm is an important aspect 
of that paradigm’s success and longevity.338 
This is especially true when designing a specialty tribunal, like the sci-
ence court, which would remove certain cases from the dockets of tradition-
al state and federal courts.  Four original experiments reported in this Arti-
cle identify the psychological perceptions that guide the public in 
determining whether to support a specialty court and demonstrate how to 
design that tribunal in a manner that maximizes those perceptions.  Perhaps 
the most important lesson to draw from these experiments is that earlier sci-
ence court architects were not prioritizing the relevant psychological princi-
ples, which is at least one reason that the science court failed to garner the 
degree of public support necessary to translate the proposal into successful 
policy. 
This Article suggests empirically that there are two major factors that 
determine whether the public supports a decisionmaking system: the sys-
tem’s ability to produce accurate decisions and the level of procedural legit-
imacy that it conveys to litigants.  Importantly, although these concepts are 
related, they are separate constructs.  The first study suggests that litigants 
perceive the adversarial system as less accurate than it is fair.
339
  Converse-
ly, the inquisitorial system is considered less fair than it is accurate.  This 
striking pattern of results supports the view that as we move across the de-
cisionmaking continuum from greater control (which litigants possess under 
                                                          
 336.  See, e.g., Stephen Giacchino & Andrew Kakabadse, Successful Policy Implementation: 
The Route to Building Self-Confident Government, 69 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 139, 139 (2003) 
(drawing upon an empirical study to determine what factors influenced the successful implemen-
tation of public policy in Malta, and in what way the government should organize itself to best 
deliver the policy); see also Will Rhee, Evidence-Based Federal Civil Rulemaking: A New Con-
temporaneous Case Coding Rule, 33 PACE L. REV. 60, 147 (2013) (explaining that evidence-based 
policymaking offers much promise for improving federal civil rulemaking, especially to address 
questions of controlling access to the courts and the amount of litigation brought). 
 337.  See, e.g., Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Aiming for Evidence-Based Gun Policy, 25 J. 
POL’Y ANAL. & MGMT. 691, 727 (2006) (explaining that empirical research can inform public 
policy on gun control by evaluating the public success of possible interventions and pinpointing 
the areas in which regulatory enforcement would be most effective). 
 338.  See, e.g., Paul Burstein, The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an 
Agenda, 56 POL’Y RES. Q. 29, 31 (2003) (commenting that public interest organizations can en-
hance policymakers’ responsiveness to public opinion by providing useful information about what 
the public wants and concluding on the whole that policymakers can create effective policy by 
responding to public opinion). 
 339.  See supra Part IV.B. 
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the adversarial model) to less control (which they possess under the inquisi-
torial model), different values are being prioritized. 
The second study—which pitted the adversarial system against the in-
quisitorial system with respect to litigants’ perceptions of decisional accu-
racy and procedural legitimacy—bolsters this conclusion.340  American liti-
gants perceived the American adversarial system as more procedurally 
legitimate than the inquisitorial system, but at a significant cost; the inquisi-
torial system was perceived to be the more accurate of the two deci-
sionmaking paradigms. 
Based on these principles, this Article proposes a redesigned science 
court with the following features: (1) expert witnesses chosen by the tribu-
nal from a pool of approved experts; (2) experienced, science-savvy judges 
and law clerks; (3) trials by jury; and (4) the opportunity for rigorous cross-
examination by the parties to the dispute.  This design incorporates ele-
ments from both the adversarial side of the decisionmaking continuum—for 
example, trials by jury and cross-examination—and the inquisitorial side of 
the continuum—for example, court-appointed expert witnesses.  The pro-
posal is designed to incorporate the aspects of the adversarial and inquisito-
rial paradigms that, together, are likely to maximize litigants’ perceptions of 
decisional accuracy and procedural legitimacy. 
This Article proposes the new science court not just on theory, but also 
on empirical evidence.  The final study reported in this Article was de-
signed to test (1) whether the science court proposed in this Article is the 
most preferred method of resolving complex scientific legal disputes; and 
(2) whether the proposed court prioritizes decisional accuracy and proce-
dural legitimacy as they are perceived by litigants.
341
  The proposed science 
court does both.  Litigants significantly preferred the proposed science court 
to three other methods of resolving complex scientific disputes: the status-
quo adversarial method, the inquisitorial method, and a modified adversari-
al method in which each party selects their expert from a limited pool of 
scientists (and engages in the oft-described “battle of the experts”).  Moreo-
ver, litigants perceived the proposed science court as more decisionally ac-
curate and more procedurally legitimate than these other methods.  A statis-
tical path analysis confirmed that litigants’ preferences for the proposed 
science court were largely based on these features of the proposal: its great-
er degree of decisional accuracy and its greater degree of procedural legiti-
macy.
342
 
In sum, litigants prefer the proposed science court, and do so for rea-
sons that we would expect based on theory and empirical data.  These re-
                                                          
 340.  See supra Part IV.C. 
 341.  See supra Part V.A. 
 342.  See supra Part V.B. 
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sults have a myriad of substantive implications.  Specifically, these results 
provide meaningful lessons for policymakers regarding how to design legal 
decisionmaking systems, and they have broader implications for the role of 
science in the courtroom. 
A.  Implications and Future Directions 
The data reported in this Article support the importance of evidenced-
based policymaking.  This is so particularly for issues of institutional de-
sign; proposals that are long on theory but short on actual empirical data 
might not be the best way in which to implement policy changes that enjoy 
broad public support.  Empirical testing can identify not only which of sev-
eral policy alternatives enjoys the broadest amount of popular support 
among the citizenry, but can also identify—and assist policymakers in max-
imizing—the psychological determinants of the public’s preferences.  To 
the extent that growing popular support exists for specialized courts—as ev-
idenced by the popularity of the Delaware Court of Chancery, the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Federal Circuit Court of Bankruptcy 
courts
343—empirical testing can assist policymakers in ensuring that these 
decisionmaking paradigms prioritize the values of the citizenry. 
To that end, the findings reported here require further exploration and 
may have implications for the design of other decisionmaking bodies.  
Americans perceive not only that the adversary system is less accurate than 
it is fair, but also that the adversary system provides less accurate decisions 
than does the inquisitorial system.
344
  This surprising (but robust) finding 
contradicts the views of policymakers who believe that cross-
examination—one of the defining features of the adversary system—will 
“out” the true facts (and produce accurate decisions) by exposing those 
facts to rigorous vetting by advocates who are biased toward finding the 
                                                          
 343.  See Jurs, supra note 37, at 24–28 (describing the capacities of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery, the bankruptcy courts, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to 
handle cases in their fields consistently, efficiently, and accurately); see also Lloyd D. George, 
From Orphan to Maturity: The Development of the Bankruptcy System During L. Ralph 
Mecham’s Tenure as Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 44 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1491, 1501 (1994) (concluding that the bankruptcy court system has developed into a sta-
ble and progressive organization, able to manage large numbers of cases and highly complex liti-
gation); Jacobs & Mireles, supra note 116, at 297 n.31 (noting that in the twenty years since the 
formation of the Federal Circuit, a coherent and consistent body of patent law has been developed, 
its stability stemming from the elimination of jurisdictional conflicts that had preceded the court’s 
formation); Nees, supra note 114, at 531 (focusing on the popularity of the Delaware Chancery 
Court as a business court that has been modeled by fourteen jurisdictions to resolve complex 
commercial disputes, and concluding there is a need to monitor their evolving capacities for eval-
uation and mediation). 
 344.  See supra Parts IV.B–C. 
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flaws in their opponent’s evidence.345  If cross-examination is not sufficient 
to alleviate the public’s concerns that evidence produced to factfinders by 
biased advocates in the adversary system leads to less accurate verdicts, this 
can encourage policymakers to explore procedures that might complement 
cross-examination and alleviate litigants’ concerns that courts in the adver-
sary system do not produce the most accurate verdicts.
346
  Continued re-
search in this vein will address not only the accuracy of verdicts but also 
perceptions of equity by litigants—that different courts may reach different 
decisions about their cases depending on the skill of the biased advocate or 
the ability of the judge or jury to understand complex evidence.
347
 
These data also support the notion that the public understands that, in 
the context of litigation, decisional accuracy and procedural legitimacy are 
distinct values that are not entirely compatible with each other.  Litigants 
appear to perceive that the decision to design a decisionmaking system in 
an adversarial paradigm instead of an inquisitorial paradigm involves a 
tradeoff of competing values.  This is consistent with, for example, the per-
spective held by many evidence scholars: that the laws of evidence involve 
a complex balancing act between creating rules that (1) assist factfinders in 
determining the truth of the matter in the litigation and (2) promote norms 
of fair play.
348
  The data reported in this Article suggest that participants’ 
perceptions of the adversary system track these commentators’ views; they 
also suggest that, at least with respect to the use of scientific evidence in 
court, litigants sometimes prefer inquisitorial procedures—such as the use 
of court-appointed expert witnesses—that will increase perceptions of deci-
sional accuracy at a cost of controlling the production of evidence.  It is 
worth exploring whether this finding is applicable to other types of cases 
beyond those that involve scientific evidence. 
The data reported in this Article have implications beyond institutional 
design; they also have implications for the debate over the use of scientific 
evidence in the courtroom.
349
  To the extent that proposals like the science 
                                                          
 345.  See Thibaut et al., supra note 181, at 389–90 (explaining that the competitive presenta-
tion of evidence counteracts decisionmaker bias, producing fair and accurate decisions). 
 346.  See Gertner, supra note 71, at 793 (voicing the concern that cross-examination may not 
lead to accurate verdicts when complex forensic procedures are at issue). 
 347.  See id. at 792–93 (concluding that effective advocacy in cases involving complex foren-
sic evidence requires familiarity with the scientific standards behind them). 
 348.  See generally ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW (2005); see also Harvey 
Rochman, Due Process: Accuracy or Opportunity?, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2705, 2709 (1992) (delin-
eating a trade-off between accuracy and procedural fairness). 
 349.  See, e.g., Stuart F. Schlossman, Some Considerations on the Misuse of Scientific Evi-
dence in the Courtroom, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 409, 411 (1997) (proposing that the legal system 
supplement the scientific knowledge of judges and juries by creating panels of unbiased scientists 
to help assess the validity of scientific claims made in the courtroom). 
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court receive attention by the legal academy and by legal policymakers,
350
 
they serve to increase public awareness of the validity and reliability issues 
that pervade the scientific techniques that are admitted into evidence.
351
  
The NAS Report provided a scathing critique of not only the quality of the 
science behind this evidence but also (1) the quality of the decisions by 
judges to admit the evidence into court; and (2) the quality of decisions ren-
dered by the factfinder.
352
  The data from this Article suggest that proposals 
to increase the quality of the inputs for the factfinder—that is, the quality of 
the scientific expertise—may benefit also from a focus on structural fea-
tures of the trial, such as the manner in which evidence is presented to the 
factfinder.  Moreover, because procedural legitimacy is also an important, 
and separate, consideration that the public considers when deciding whether 
to accept the verdicts of a decisionmaking body, these structural procedures 
cannot be implemented with a myopic focus solely on the increase in deci-
sional accuracy that these new structures may promote.  In sum, a partner-
ship between the increasingly vocal critics of forensic science and architects 
of innovative institutional design can, in tandem, design a decisionmaking 
structure that will reduce the concerns raised by litigants, policymakers, ac-
ademics, attorneys, and judges over the current shortcomings that courts 
face when evaluating scientific evidence.  More research is, however, nec-
essary. 
B.  Practical and Philosophical Objections 
The redesigned science court faces substantial practical and philosoph-
ical hurdles before policymakers can implement it.
353
  The objections are 
                                                          
 350.  See generally Jurs, supra note 37, at 3–4 (recounting the proposal for a science court in 
the 1970s and drawing upon the public debate in proposing a modern Court of Scientific Jurisdic-
tion under Article III that would objectify scientific analysis, incorporate expertise into the deci-
sionmaking process, and remove improper influences from the presentation of science in court). 
 351.  See, e.g., Cornelia Dean, When Questions of Science Come to a Courtroom, Truth Has 
Many Faces, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2006, at F3 (commenting in the context of the Supreme Court 
hearing global warming arguments in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), that scholars 
and officials have proposed creating a science court to resolve factual disputes); see also Alice 
Dreger, A Call for Passion in the Realm of Discovery, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1999, at F4 (opposing 
the use of court-appointed panels of scientists to evaluate scientific facts at issue in court cases, 
supporting instead funneling cases that turn on complex scientific issues to judges with the appro-
priate scientific training). 
 352.  STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 32, at 85–110. 
 353.  See Jurs, supra note 37, at 39 (explaining that just as the Kantrowitz proposal for a sci-
ence court was attacked by critics before it faded into obscurity, so will any new science court 
proposal). 
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varied, and focus on (1) facets of the empirical evidence in support of the 
science court; and (2) facets of the science court itself.
354
 
The biggest objection to the empirical evidence supporting the rede-
signed science court stems from its ecological validity.
355
  If an experiment 
is ecologically invalid, it might tell us how the study participants behave in 
a laboratory, but would tell us little about how they would behave in the re-
al world.
356
  With respect to the redesigned science court, we might wonder 
whether participants’ responses on survey data meaningfully predict how 
they actually behave.  Prior research on this question is encouraging, and 
suggests that “pen-and-paper” laboratory studies tend to replicate into real 
world behavior roughly two-thirds of the time.
357
  Moreover, unlike actual 
behavior, there is no obvious theoretical reason to believe that participants’ 
preferences for different legal procedures would change systematically out-
side of the laboratory, and policymakers use these types of survey data rou-
tinely when making decisions about legal policy.
358
 
The remaining practical concerns about the science court arise not 
from the empirical evidence but from the science court itself.
359
  In discuss-
ing these concerns, it is important to clarify the scope of the normative rec-
ommendations included in this Article.  If we believe that a science court is 
the policy solution to the scientific evidence crisis, then we should design 
that court in a manner that will boost its acceptance among the public. Ear-
lier proposals, however, failed to identify and maximize those psychologi-
                                                          
 354.  See id. at 12–14 (detailing both procedural and substantive criticisms of the science court, 
including the problem of separating science from fact in cases, as well as the possibility of a court 
bringing an “authoritarian finality” to scientific inquiry). 
 355.  Ecological validity refers to the degree to which we are able to generalize about the find-
ings inside the laboratory to the real world.  See Marilynn B. Brewer, Research Design and Issues 
of Validity, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 
3, 12 (Harry T. Reis & Charles M. Judd eds., 2000) (explaining that “ecological validity” refers to 
“whether an effect has been demonstrated to occur under conditions that are typical for the popu-
lation at large”). 
 356.  See id. (commenting that the setting in which a causal principle is demonstrated may not 
resemble the settings in which that principle operates in real life). 
 357.  Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, in BEHAVIORAL 
LAW & ECONOMICS 61, 73 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). 
 358.  See, e.g., Bettina Berendt et al., Privacy in E-Commerce: Stated Preferences vs. Actual 
Behavior, 48 COMM. OF THE ACM, Apr. 2005, at 101, 105 (finding from an empirical study of 
Internet users that EU e-privacy laws were often ineffective; while the laws assumed that Internet 
users would act according to their own privacy interests, participants’ Internet behavior indicated 
that they derived a false sense of security from these laws). 
 359.  See Jurs, supra note 37, at 39–40 (explaining that the proposal for a science court re-
ceived criticisms of its procedures for selection of advocates and judges, what issues it should ad-
dress, its methods of dispute resolution, its predisposition for authoritarianism, and its susceptibil-
ity to capture by special interests). 
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cal perceptions.
360
  This Article focuses less on whether to adopt the science 
court itself—which is, in part, a philosophical question—but rather how to 
design it in the best way when proposing it.  Although successful policy 
implementation involves myriad factors beyond public acceptance,
361
 this is 
a substantial part of the equation; empirical and psychological evidence can 
provide valuable insight to policymakers regarding how to maximize this 
aspect of policy implementation.
362
  Nonetheless, it is important to discuss 
some of the practical and philosophical concerns with the science court 
while noting that others have addressed them in more detail than I can 
here.
363
 
Perhaps the greatest difficulties in implementing the science court in-
volve issues of selection and scope: critics of the science court wonder how 
cases will be selected for the court, how the expert pools will be created, 
how judges would be selected, and the nature of appellate review.
364
  None 
of these concerns is entirely novel and has been addressed by legal schol-
ars.
365
  For example, with respect to the jurisdiction of the science court, 
critics expressed concern that, because scientific evidence—in at least some 
form—is becoming so prevalent in modern litigation, the science court 
might collapse under its own weight by hearing too many cases.
366
  Multi-
part tests for jurisdiction are designed to combat this problem, including re-
stricting such cases to those that meet the test of diversity of citizenship, 
                                                          
 360.  See Arthur Kantrowitz, Elitism vs. Checks and Balances in Communicating Scientific 
Information to the Public, 4 RISK 101, 108 (1993) (commenting that the original proposal for the 
science court failed in part because “although both sides of the Washington politics-science com-
plex would give lip service to the need for new procedures, they were unwilling to aid in creating 
an institution that might not be easy to control”). 
 361.  See Giacchino & Kakabadse, supra note 336, at 144 (explaining the array of factors nec-
essary for successful policy implementation, including strong project management). 
 362.  See Burstein, supra note 338, at 29 (explaining that there are substantial empirical rela-
tionships between opinion and policy, public opinion being influential even in the face of activi-
ties by interest organizations, political parties, and elites); see also Benjamin I. Page & Robert Y. 
Shapiro, Effects of Public Opinion on Policy, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 175, 188–89 (1983) (con-
cluding that there is a substantial congruence between opinion and policy, and that opinion chang-
es are important causes of policy changes). 
 363.  For a thorough argument for the viability of the science court, see generally Jurs, supra 
note 37, at 28 (discussing the benefits and criticisms of a proposed Court of Scientific Jurisdic-
tion). 
 364.  See Wilford, supra note 111 (noting that a scientific court would leave unresolved the 
problem of balancing scientific facts and value judgments in decisionmaking). 
 365.  See, e.g., Jurs, supra note 37, at 32–35 (proposing that judges be selected for a new sci-
ence court based on experience in diverse scientific fields, and that all appeals go to a single fo-
rum in order to maximize expertise of appellate level review). 
 366.  See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (1989) (acknowledging that expanding the specialized court’s juris-
diction might overload its docket, but suggesting that creating specialized jurisdictions within re-
gional circuits might relieve this pressure). 
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that have a complex scientific issue as the main issue in the case, and that 
require novel scientific expertise.
367
 
Scholars have suggested that selecting the relevant legal actors—the 
expert witnesses and the presiding judges—might not be as daunting as crit-
ics believe.
368
  Scholars have proposed that membership in scientific expert 
pools can be determined by criteria that can be gleaned from a candidate’s 
resume—for example, the candidate’s education, volume and placement of 
publications, number of research presentations, research grants attained, and 
work-related accolades—and from colleagues in the field—for example, re-
views of the quality and impact of the candidate’s body of work.369  Judges 
would be selected for the court on the basis of additional education in the 
sciences—for example, a master’s degree or doctorate in a scientific field—
or through standardized, skills-based assessments.
370
  Moreover, judges 
specially trained in a specific discipline would hear cases in “neighboring 
fields” to avoid potential bias.371 
Perhaps the best proposal for appellate review of science court deci-
sions suggests that it vest in the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.
372
  The 
court’s considerable expertise in patent law could be expanded to other sci-
ences by continuing to appoint science-savvy judges to the court and ex-
panding the skill sets of judges who already sit on the court.
373
  Vesting ap-
pellate review in panels of science-savvy Federal Circuit justices would 
also minimize potential concerns that either the science court judge—or the 
                                                          
 367.  Jurs, supra note 37, at 30–31.  Some of these questions, of course, involve definitional 
ambiguity: for example, how do we determine whether existing procedural safeguards might lead 
the generalist factfinder to commit error?  This dilemma underscores the need for additional em-
pirical evidence.  Data is collected daily from legal institutions including: the National Center for 
State Courts, the SCJ, the Arizona Jury Project, and from psychology departments at major re-
search universities, regarding how factfinders understand—or fail to understand—scientific evi-
dence.  Mining these resources might provide policymakers with an empirical framework from 
which to decide which cases would be prime candidates for the science court. 
 368.  See SAKS & VAN DUIZEND, supra note 104, at 95–96. 
 369.  See id. 
 370.  See Kantrowitz, Proposal, supra note 124, at 763–64 (commenting that the scientific 
judge’s scientific background should enable him to more quickly assess the evidence and partici-
pate in cross-examination procedures). 
 371.  Arthur Kantrowitz, The Science Court—Another Alternative, 18 PTC J. RES. & ED. 61, 
64 (1976).  
 372.  But see Dreyfuss, supra note 366, at 69–70 (acknowledging that the Federal Circuit is 
arguably a good venue to take on scientific questions because it deals with complex technological 
issues, but pointing out that bringing cases in this court would do nothing to solve the more fun-
damental problem that disputes arising as scientific questions are in fact pure policy disputes). 
 373.  See, e.g., Jurs, supra note 37, at 35 (explaining that the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
would be a natural location for an appeals forum for the science court because it often handles the 
complex science and technology involved in patent law). 
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expert that she selects—is biased with respect to the scientific issue in the 
litigation.
374
 
In sum, considerable practical and philosophical concerns about the 
science court abound, and the concerns addressed here represent just a sam-
ple.
375
  Yet none of these concerns appears insurmountable.
376
  The guiding 
principle seems to be—not just with respect to the practical concerns raised 
about the science court, but about the very nature of the science court it-
self—the importance of empirically-based research and policy solutions.  
Whether to mollify policy critics or to garner maximal public support for 
the policy (which may, in turn, increase the willingness of policymakers to 
act), empirically-supported solutions provide uniquely important contribu-
tions to these policy debates.  Policymakers would be wise to encourage 
their use and to rely on them accordingly. 
C.  Conclusions 
The scientific evidence crisis is a crisis of our own making.  There can 
be little doubt that the crisis was paved with good intentions.  Expertise—
and in particular, scientific expertise—can be an exceedingly important tool 
for assisting decisionmakers who are tasked with rendering verdicts in cases 
arising from complex civil and criminal disputes.  But policymakers’ eager-
ness to assist factfinders in this capacity may have spread too quickly too 
soon, and has not only allowed disciplines that rely on questionable science 
into the courtroom, but has also solidified their role in legal decisionmak-
ing, even in the face of mounting criticism from actors from all areas of the 
legal and scientific communities. 
Attempts to purify the quality of the scientific evidence admitted into 
court is an important first step in this process, and (albeit slowly) courts ap-
pear more receptive to these criticisms than they have been in the past.  But 
improving the quality of the evidence is only half the battle: As Judge 
Gertner has noted, we “should not let courts or lawyers off the hook.”377  
We must also examine the manner in which scientific evidence is consid-
ered by legal factfinders and decide whether better alternatives exist. 
                                                          
 374.  See id. at 74 (noting that regional circuits would be well-positioned to prevent parochial-
ism and correct bias in review of patent court decisions). 
 375.  See, e.g., James A. Martin, The Proposed “Science Court,” 75 MICH. L. REV. 1058, 1085 
(1977) (detailing other concerns with the proposal for a science court, including that “public fund-
ing of research in particular scientific areas may be curtailed by determinations of a science court 
on those matters”). 
 376.  See, e.g., Jurs, supra note 37, at 39–40 (explaining that a new science court could avoid a 
predisposition of authoritarianism by enforcing the precedential effects of case law, and that it 
could avoid judicial myopia resulting from decisionmaking in one area by promoting judicial in-
terest in areas beyond the fields of specialization). 
 377.  Gertner, supra note 71, at 793. 
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To that end, a science court that is shown empirically to maximize the 
public’s perceptions of the court’s decisional accuracy and its procedural 
legitimacy is an important proposal that policymakers should consider.  
Other proposals are welcome, and empirical researchers must keep working 
on this important and urgent issue.  Litigants like Sally Clark and Douglas 
Prade are counting on us. 
 
 
